### STATE OF MICHIGAN

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TAMARA FILAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Court of Appeals No: 317972

Circuit Court No: 13-000652-NI

-VS-

KEVIN THOMAS CULPERT, AND EFFICIENT DESIGN, INC., A Michigan Corporation.

### Defendants-Appellees.

	/		
TAMARA FILAS	MICHAEL C. O'MALLEY (P59108)		
Plaintiff-Appellant	Attorney for Defendant Efficient Design		
6477 Edgewood Rd.	Vandeveer Garzia		
Canton, MI 48187	1450 W. Long Lake Rd., Suite 100		
(734) 751-0103	Troy, MI 48098		
e-mail redacted	(248) 312-2940		
Control of the contro	momalley@vgpclaw.com		
	, = 02		
DREW W. BROADDUS (P64658)	JAMES C. WRIGHT (P67613)		
Attorney for Defendant Culpert	Attorney for Defendant Efficient Design		
Secrest Wardle	Zausmer, Kaufman, August & Caldwell, P.C.		
2600 Troy Center Drive, P.O. Box 5025	31700 Middlebelt Rd., Suite 150		
Troy, MI 48007-5025	Farmington Hills, MI 48334		
(616) 272-7966	(248) 851-4111		
dbroaddus@secrestwardle.com	jwright@zkact.com		
	60 20		

### PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE EFFICIENT DESIGN INC.'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

\*\*\*ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED\*\*\*

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• Relevant page from Efficient Design's Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff dated 2-7-13, but mailed 4-30-13	
<ul> <li>Relevant page of Mr. Wright's 2-5-13 Answer to Complaint against         Efficient Design stating Culpert was not an agent of Efficient Design         and was not in the course and scope of his employment when the         alleged accident occurred</li></ul>	
• Signed cover letter verifying authorizations were received by Mr. Wright's law firm at 11:24 AM on 6-24-13	

•	Register of Actions dated 6-24-13 and 1-21-14
•	6-24-13 FedEx time/date stamped envelope, stamped 3:00 PM
•	List of SCAO-mandated forms. J
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•	6-23-11 Memorandum from Chad C. Schmucker, State Court Administrator
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### **INDEX OF AUTHORITIES**

CASES:
Halbert v Michigan, 545 US 605, 617 n 3: 125 S Ct 2582 (2005)7
STATUTES AND COURT RULES:
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MCR 2.314(C)(1)
MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a)1-3, 7-10
MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d)

### INTRODUCTION

Throughout Efficient Design Inc.'s ("EDI") 1-23-13 Brief on Appeal, Defendant-Appellee ("DF-AE") portrays the Plaintiff-Appellant ("PL-AT") as an obstinate person refusing to cooperate with discovery, attempting to control which specific medical records were released, and who does not wish to comply with the court rules, exactly opposite of the truth. Plaintiff strived to abide by court rules, especially MCR 2.314. It is the DF-AEs and the Court who have refused to comply with the court rules by denying PL-AT the right to use SCAO-mandated medical authorization Form MC 315 ("MC 315") to disclose her medical records to the DF-AEs under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) and/or (d).

By never once referring to MC 315 by name, and instead calling it a "release" in quotes, or "her own authorizations," DF-AE's accounting gives the false impression that PL-AT used forms she created herself and/or added amendments/alterations to forms. DF-AE made the unsubstantiated claim that MC 315 "could mislead providers into producing the records to Plaintiff and not Defendants-Appellees." **PL-AT used unmodified, unaltered, MC 315 Forms.** 

Contrary to the DF-AE's accounting of events, PL-AT mailed completed copies of MC 315 to <u>ALL of her healthcare providers</u> so both Defendants, Kevin Culpert and EDI, could receive copies of <u>any and all of her medical records</u>, both <u>prior to and after the accident</u>, back to birth, <u>without exceptions</u>. PL-AT included cover letters with detailed lists for each provider, of every visit date related to the 1-15-10 auto accident, <u>as a courtesy</u>, to ensure that Defendants had a checklist upon which they could rely upon to verify that they received all records. PL-AT permitted disclosure of all medical records discoverable using MC 315, and did not selectively "cherry pick" which records to disclose, as claimed by DF-AE.

By altering quotations, inserting fallacious arguments and false allegations, and deviating from the Plaintiff's main argument of her right to use MC 315 to provide her medical records, it

is the DF-AE that is misdirecting the court from the true issues of the case. DF-AE alleges that the PL-AT has attempted to obstruct the discovery process and that this is not a "battle of the forms," yet that is exactly what it is. Records copying service forms became an issue after PL-AT's first auto attorney, Terry Cochran was hired. In both PL-AT's separately re-filed first- and third-party cases, all PL-AT has ever tried to do was provide her medical records to the DF-AEs using MC 315, yet neither the DF-AEs nor the court wanted to follow the court rules. This is not an issue of the PL-AT refusing to follow a reasonable discovery order. The Court had no authority to order PL-AT to use any specific form to provide her medical records, and certainly could not have refused her the right to use MC 315 under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d). Therefore, the court's order for PL-AT to sign Mr. Wright's personal forms was unreasonable, and PL-AT's case should not have been dismissed for her refusal to follow said order.

#### REPLY TO STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court's decision to dismiss her case because it refused to accept the copies of MC 315 PL-AT had already sent to her healthcare providers to disclose copies of her medical records to both DF-AE's, Culpert and EDI, is an abuse of discretion by the court, and is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, a-d, when a party is served with a request for production of documents, as provided under MCR 2.314(C)(1), and satisfies that request by submitting MC 315 forms to her health care providers that meet both MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) and (d). It is not improper conduct for PL-AT to exercise her right to provide records using MC 315.

MCR 2.314(C)(1), Response by Party to Request for Medical Information, states:

- (1) A party who is served with a request for production of medical information under MCR 2.310 must either:
- (a) make the information available for inspection and copying as requested;
- (b) assert that the information is privileged;
- (c) object to the request as permitted by MCR 2.310(C)(2); or
- (d) furnish the requesting party with signed authorizations in the form approved by the state court administrator sufficient in number to enable the requesting party to obtain the information requested from persons,

institutions, hospitals, and other custodians in actual possession of the information requested.

There is no defined method of providing medical records under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a), which merely states the obligation to "make the information available for copying and inspection as requested" which PL-AT did. Under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d), it is mandated that the authorization form to be used is MC 315 (Ex. J, K).

The position of the Michigan Supreme Court in regard to the use of Form MC 315 was re-confirmed on 6-23-11, in a memorandum from Chad C. Schmucker, State Court Administrator, who quotes the procedural rules regarding forms contained in MCR 1.109, stating, "Unless specifically required by statute or court rule, the court may not mandate the use of a specific form, whether SCAO-approved or locally developed." Mr. Schmucker also clarifies, "Courts cannot impose additional procedures beyond those contained in the court rules. Therefore, all courts must accept court forms approved by the Supreme Court or the state court administrator" (Ex. DD). Therefore, PL-AT's submission of MC 315 should have been accepted by the lower court. PL-AT's current position is that the Judge cannot mandate Plaintiff to use any specific form to provide medical records to DF-AEs.

#### REPLY TO COUNTER-STATEMENT OF OUESTION INVOLVED

PL-AT did not place her mental condition at issue. The alleged personal head injury, in itself, does not raise a mental condition issue in the complaint as filed.

PL-AT never claimed "she could create her own authorizations and limit the scope of discovery." PL-AT claimed she could use form MC 315, which releases all medical records for discovery she is obliged to provide by law. PL-AT did not refuse to participate in discovery. She used MC 315 to disclose any and all records from all health care providers back to birth to both DF-AEs, and mailed MC 315 forms 6-21-14. PL-AT refused to repeat the process of

sending forms to her providers using the DF-AE's customized forms, as the Court's Order required, since it was her right under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d) to provide her records using MC 315.

### REPLY TO COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

PL-AT denies she did not put forth all material facts and that they were not presented without bias or argument. PL-AT did provide references to exhibits that supported her facts. DF-AE requests that PL-AT's Statement of facts is stricken and that his "relevant facts" apply to the decision of these issues. However, many of his "facts" are erroneous, unsupported and/or altered. For example, PL-AT did not provide "some" discovery responses on 6-21-13. She provided "ALL" discovery responses. DF-AE's claim PL-AT argued liability of MEEMIC Ins. Co. in the no-fault case is untrue and nonsensical since liability of one's <u>own</u> insurance company is "given" in a no-fault auto case. Most unsettling, DF-AE provided only a partial quote by the Judge to change it's meaning to the opposite of what she intended. On pg. 3, last line, DF-AE shortened Judge Borman's quote from: "I'll see you Monday, hopefully not." to "I'll see you Monday.", deliberately altering the meaning to deceive this court to imply that PL-AT was to appear on Monday, 6-24-13, instead of the understanding at the 6-21-13 hearing that the PL-AT had to deliver the signed authorizations to Mr. Wright before 2:00 p.m. on 6-24-13, thus, there would be no reason for anyone to appear before Judge Borman at 2:00 on 6-24-13 if the authorizations were already delivered. The authorizations were timely delivered (Ex. C, FF). PL-AT looked at the Register of Actions on the morning of 6-24-13 and printed the Register of Actions after the close of court at 4:30 PM and no hearing was shown for 6-24-13 (Ex. D). Currently, the Register of Actions lists a "special conference" held 6-24-13 at 2:00 PM.

PL-AT denies DF-AE's claim that it is undisputed that PL-AT did not provide all authorizations that had been requested. This <u>is</u> disputed. With regard to the production of

medical records for EDI, it is not true that "blanket medical releases" were sought, as DF-AE states on pg. 2. Mr. Wright's 4-30-13 Motion to Compel was based on a Request for Production of "copies of any and all medical records relating to injuries received as a result of the subject accident," (Ex. A). No specific medical releases were attached to the Request. At 11:24 a.m. on 6-24-13 (Ex. C), PL-AT delivered to Mr. Wright's office, copies of signed MC 315 for all her healthcare providers, and copies of certificates of mailing verifying mailing to providers on 6-21-13. PL-AT satisfied the requests made in the 4-30-13 Motion to Compel.

The FedEx packet PL-AT received on 6-24-13 included forms in addition to the medical release forms Judge Borman ordered Mr. Wright to provide by 6-21-13 to PL-AT. None of the new requests for discovery documents and authorization forms accompanying them for PL-AT to sign, were previously requested by EDI in the original Interrogatories or Requests for Production of Documents mailed to Plaintiff 4-30-13. On pg. 11, DF-AE refers to PL-AT's "hyper-technical argument on appeal that she is not obliged to sign additional authorizations because Efficient originally asked for fewer providers." EDI originally asked for all providers mentioned in PL-AT's interrogatories, which is what PL-AT disclosed. The additional requests were for academic records, employment records, tax returns, Blue Cross Blue Shield and MEEMIC insurance records, psychotherapy notes, and records from Don Massey Cadillac. A new Motion to Compel would need to be filed in order to request said records beyond the medical records originally requested in the 4-30-13 Motion to Compel relating to the Request for Production dated 2-7-13 but mailed 4-30-13 (Ex. EE p. 14-15). DF-AE erroneously claims PL-AT's refusal to provide the additional documents is because DF-AE's liability hasn't been established. Although PL-AT still argues she should not have had to provide medical records to EDI since they have claimed Culpert was not an agent of EDI and was not in the course and scope of his employment (Ex. B),

her refusal to provide the additional records is because those records were not requested with the Motion to Compel that was granted by the Court, not because of liability concerns. It should also be noted that in the footnote on pg. 9, even DF-AE points out that he could not find case law regarding the production of documents to a non-liable party, likely because of the mere absurdity that a Court would ever order a Plaintiff to provide sensitive medical information to a party that denies the Defendant (Culpert) was even their employee, as the court has done in this case. It is likely no such cases exist since addressing liability before providing records only makes common sense. Still, the liability issue is irrelevant, since PL-AT provided her records as the Court ordered, with the liability issue still unresolved. DF-AE spends a lot of time discussing PL-AT's prior arguments for not providing records to EDI, which no longer matter, since PL-AT ultimately provided copies of the completed, signed MC 315 authorizations and proof of mailing them to her providers on 6-21-13, to Mr. Wright's office prior to 2:00 p.m., 6-24-13.

DF-AE claims "it is undisputed, and not mentioned by Plaintiff, that she had more opportunities to provide the requested authorizations." It is irrelevant if PL-AT had time between 6-24-13 and the 8-9-13 hearing to provide authorizations on Mr. Wright's forms, since she had already submitted MC 315 to all of her providers to fulfill her obligation. PL-AT had not expected the Judge to order her to repeat the process with Mr. Wright's forms or to dismiss her case because she used MC 315. PL-AT would have refused to sign Mr. Wright's forms regardless of when she received them.

### REPLY TO LAW AND ARGUMENT

DF-AE erroneously claims PL-AT's case "was not dismissed due to the choice of forms," but "for her willful refusal to follow the orders of the trial court and engage in the discovery process." PL-AT did engage in discovery when she provided her medical records to the DF-AEs

by sending copies of SCAO-mandated Form 315 to her health care providers so both DF-AEs, Culpert, and EDI, would receive copies of medical records from all of the providers she listed in her answers to both DF-AEs' interrogatories. PL-AT allowed her case to be dismissed, because she had already completed her legal obligation under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) and/or (d) to provide medical records to Mr. Wright using MC 315. It is not in the court's power to require PL-AT to repeat the process using Mr. Wright's form, or any specific form, for that matter (Ex. DD).

PL-AT denies DF-AE's frivolous claim the PL-AT took over "prosecution" of her civil case. PL-AT took over her civil auto-related cases *pro per* after counsel that has previously agreed to take over, bailed, after Judge Borman dismissed her cases.

DF-AE claims PL-AT "has refused to provide "open access" to her medical, employment and insurance records based upon her perception that she is entitled to 'privacy." First, as already explained, employment and insurance records were not part of the DF-AE's Motion to Compel. Regarding her medical records, which were part of the Motion to Compel, PL-AT was ordered to sign Mr. Wright's personal authorization forms that allow him to act as a records copy service. PL-AT has the right to refuse to provide records to a person or entity that intends to copy and re-disclose her records. MC 315 contains no language permitting such "open access." DF-AE claims "open access" is required under the Court Rules, but cites no rule.

In her Brief, PL-AT clearly stated Court Rule MCR 2.314(C)(1), and provided clear arguments and rationale for having met the requirements to provide her medical records to the DF-AEs through her use of MC 315. The COA's principal function is to correct errors made by lower courts. *Halbert v Michigan*, 545 US 605, 617 n 3: 125 S Ct 2582 (2005). MCR 2.314(C)(1) is a clear and unambiguous court rule. The Circuit Court violated this rule by dismissing PL-AT's case by refusing to allow PL-AT to provide her medical records to DF-AEs

via the method(s) provided for under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) and/or MCR.2.314(C)(1)(d). An error has been made by the lower court's refusal to allow PL-AT's use of SCAO Form MC 315. The proper relief would be to require that the lower court uphold the provisions of MCR 2.314(C)(1).

PL-AT has never argued that she can "refuse to sign authorizations" or "limit the information sought" as DF-AE alleges. PL-AT's primary argument is that she can use MC 315 as the authorization form to provide her medical records. MC 315 itself limits information sought to include only legally discoverable information (i.e. MC 315 does not allow disclosure of psychiatric records). PL-AT permitted a full and complete release of her medical records to the DF-AEs. DF-AE argues that PL-AT didn't object to Mr. Wright's forms until her case was dismissed, but it wasn't possible to object sooner since PL-AT did not have the forms until 6-24-13, the date the case was dismissed, and she was not notified that she needed to appear in court on 6-24-13, or she would have presented her arguments at that time (Ex. E). DF-AE claims PL-AT should have called counsel later in the afternoon on 6-24-14 to check on the status of the releases. PL-AT asserts it should have been Mr. Wright who should have informed PL-AT that the executed copies of MC 315 sent to her providers on 6-21-13 were unacceptable and that he planned to have her case dismissed that afternoon. It should be noted by the COA, that throughout this appeal process, Mr. Wright has been completely silent, letting the other two attorneys write the briefs and motions to affirm, even though it is Mr. Wright, EDI's attorney, who had the PL-ΛT's case dismissed. Culpert's attorney submitted a concurrence regarding Mr. Wright's Motion to Dismiss, but provided no reasons on his behalf (Ex. L). Culpert's attorney also received copies of MC 315 as well, but never objected. Mr. O'Malley, EDI's other attorney, did not ask for interrogatories, make a request for production, or request any signed authorizations from PL-AT. It seems unusual that two other attorneys are explaining the events

that occurred between Mr. Wright and PL-AT, and that Mr. Wright has not chosen to explain the events himself.

Again, let it be clear PL-AT used completed, non-modified, non-altered, non-amended Form MC 315 to disclose any and all medical records from all treatment providers both <u>prior to and after the accident</u>, back to birth, <u>without exceptions</u>. Treatment dates for auto-related visits were provided <u>as a courtesy</u>, not to limit records disclosed. PL-AT filled out MC 315 correctly—there should have been no confusion as to whom would receive the records, as DF-AE claims. DF-AE has provided no evidence of his claims that PL-AT's "filings and her actions show that she has intended to avoid producing medical records until she was satisfied that they were relevant." Again, DF-AE brings up old arguments regarding Plaintiff's filings *before* she was ordered to produce her records to EDI. Since PL-AT *did* produce records for EDI using MC 315, her previous arguments for not producing them are irrelevant.

The trial Court's decision to refuse to accept copies of signed MC 315 authorization forms already sent to PL-AT's providers to release medical records to both DF-AE's, Culpert and EDI and to dismiss PL-AT's case is an abuse of discretion, and cannot be considered within the range of "reasonable and principled outcomes", a-d, when a party is served with a request for production of documents under MCR 2.314(C)(1), when submission of MC 315 to PL-AT's providers would satisfy both MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) and (d).


It is irrelevant how many "chances" PL-AT was given to sign Mr. Wright's forms, when PL-AT's argument is that the Court could not order her to use a particular form to provide records to Mr. Wright and, she had the right to choose MC 315 to provide her records. PL-AT has not flagrantly and defiantly ignored the directive of the court to provide medical authorizations as claimed by DF-AE. Also, DF-AE's comments about PL-AT not providing

records until liability was determined, or that PL-AT didn't check her e-mail, have absolutely no relevance since PL-AT, to expedite discovery, ultimately and timely provided copies of MC 315 forms mailed to her providers to Mr. Wright at 11:24 a.m., well before 2:00 p.m. on 6-24-13.

### REPLY TO CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

PL-AT has not refused to conform to the Court Rules---it is the Court and the DF-AEs who refused to follow MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) and/or (d) and acknowledge PL-AT's right to use SCAO-mandated medical authorization Form MC 315 ("MC 315") to disclose her medical records. PL-AT's obligation to provide her medical records to the DF-AEs should be considered met. This case should be remanded back to the circuit court for continued proceedings.

The circuit court also erred by dismissing claims against <u>both</u> Culpert and EDI, as the case involves two separate defendants with different liability insurance policies. PL-AT was in compliance will all of Culpert's discovery requests (Ex. EE, p. 12-13; Ex L). Although Mr. Hassouna, Culpert's attorney, filed a concurrence with Mr. Wright's motion to dismiss the case against EDI, he provided no arguments to substantiate his removal from the case. Also, Mr. Hassouna was ready to settle in 2012 prior to dismissal of 2011 Case #11-014149-NF (Ex. M, Y, Z, EE p. 9-12). In Thomas K. Culpert's Brief in Support of his Motion to Affirm, Mr. Broaddus, appellate attorney for Mr. Culpert, did not argue on behalf of Mr. Culpert regarding any issues with Form MC 315 that PL-AT provided to Mr. Hassouna, but instead only argued discovery issues raised by EDI. Mr. O'Malley also argued only for EDI as well. PL-AT requests the dismissal of the case against Culpert to be reversed and remanded back to the circuit court, regardless of the decision pertaining to the dismissal of PL-AT's case against EDI.



## Exhibit A

Zausmer, Kaufman, August & Caldwell, P.C. 31700 Middlebelt Road, Suite 150, Farmington Hills, MI 48334-2374 • 721 N. Capitol, Suite 2, Lansing, MI 48906-5163 2. Admit that Plaintiff is not currently under any doctor's disabilities related to this accident. If your answer is anything less than a complete admission, please provide any and all documentation in support of your answer.

#### **RESPONSE:**

 Admit that Plaintiff is currently working. If your answer is anything less than a complete admission, please provide and all documentation in support of your answer.

### **RESPONSE:**

4. Admit that Plaintiff is able to work. If your answer is anything less than a complete admission, please provide any and all documentation in support of your answer.

#### RESPONSE:

### Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff

1. Copies of any and all medical records relating to injuries received as a result of the subject accident.

### RESPONSE

2. Please produce copies of any and all photographs with regard to this accident.

#### RESPONSE

\*\*\*Defendants will pay reasonable photocopying costs for the documents produced.\*\*\*

Zausmer, Kaufman, August, & Caldwell, P.C.

JAMES C. WRIGHT (P67613)

Attorney for Defendant Efficient Design

31700 Middlebelt Road, Suite 150

Farmington Hills, MI 48334

(248) 851-4111 Dated: February 7, 2013 is receiving Medicare/Medicaid benefits. If so, please sign the enclosed authorization form, and submit with your Answers to these Interrogatories pursuant to MCR 2.310.

ANSWER:

5. Will you agree to supplement these answers throughout the course of discovery if any answer becomes incorrect?

ANSWER:

Zausmer, Kaufman, August & Caldwell, P.C.

JAMES CLWRIGHT (P67613)

Attorneys for Defendant Efficient Design 31700 Middlebelt Road, Suite 150 Farmington Hills, MI 48334

(248) 851-4111

Dated: February 7, 2013

### Exhibit B

Zausmer, Kaufman, August & Celbwell, P.C. 31790 Middlebelt Road, Suite 150, Farmington Hills, MI 48334-2374 \* 721 N. Capitol. Suite 2, Lansing, MI 48906-5163

- 8. Plaintiff's Complaint is barred in whole or in part by the Doctrine of Release.
- Plaintiff's Complaint is barred in whole or in part by the Last Clear Chance
   Doctrine.
- 10. Defendant maintains that it is entitled to reimbursement of costs and attorney fees pursuant to MCR 2.625(2) because the claims brought are frivolous within the meaning of that court rule.
- 11. Under the terms, conditions and provisions of the so-called No-Fault Act, MCLA 500.3101, et seq., Plaintiff may not recover against the Defendant for items of economic expense including, but not limited to, medical, hospital, drug bills, lost earnings and lost earning capacity.
- 12. Another person or entity is at fault, whether a party or non-party, and pursuant to MCL 600.2957 and MCR 2.112(K), fault must be allocated to them.
- 13. Venue is improper.
- 14. Sudden emergency.
- 15. Defendants are not an owner of the vehicle involved in the accident.
- 16. Defendant Culpert was not an agent of Defendant Efficient Design, Inc. and was not in the course and scope of his employment when the alleged accident occurred.
- 17. Further, Defendant reserves the right to file further Affirmative Defenses which may be revealed by discovery.

Zausmer, Kaufman, August & Caldwell, P.C.

/s/ James C. Wright
JAMES C. WRIGHT (P67613)
Attorneys for Defendant Efficient Design
31700 Middlebelt Road, Suite 150
Farmington Hills, MI 48334
(248) 851-4111

Dated: February 5, 3013

# Exhibit C

### Exhibit C

6477 Edgewood Canton, MI 48187 June 24, 2013

Mr. James Wright 31700 Middlebelt Rd., Suite 150 Farmington Hills, MI 48334

Dear Mr. Wright,

Attached please find copies of fully executed authorizations to health care providers. Copies of certificates of mailing are attached to verify mailing on June 21, 2013.

Yours truly,

Signature

Tamara Filas

Received by:

Date/time: 0-24-/3

## Exhibit D

04/24/2013 Notice of Hearing, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)

04/26/2013 CANCELED Motion Hearling (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Rorman, Susan D.)

EXHIBIT D Pg. 1
REGISTER OF ACTIONS

	CASE No. 13-000652-NI	
	RELATED CASE INFORMATION	
Related Ca	ses	
11-014149	I-NF (Prior Action)	
Defendant	CULPERT, KEVINTHOMAS	Lead Attorneys Ahmed M. Hassouna Retained (248) 764-1127(W)
Defendant	EFFICIENT DESIGN, INC.	James C. Wright Retained (248) 851-4111(W)
Plaintiff	Filas, Tamara	Pro Se
Plaintiff	FILAS, TAMARA	Daryle G. Salisbury Retained (248) 348-6820(W)
***************************************	EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT	
01/14/2013	OTHER EVENTS AND HEARINGS Service Review Scheduled  (Due Date: 04/15/2013) (Clerk: Tyler,F) Status Conference Scheduled	
	(Clerk: Tyler,F) Case Filing Fee - Paid	
	\$150.00 Fee Paid (Clerk: Tyler,F) Complaint, Filed	
02/06/2013	(Clerk: Bynum,D)  Answer to Complaint-with Jury Demand, Filed	
02/06/2013	Proof of Service, Filed; Affirmative Defenses, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)  Proof of Service, Filed  (Clerk: Tyler,F)	
02/07/2013	Request for Admissions, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)	
	Appearance of Attorney, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)	
	Service of Complaint, filed  (Clerk: Tyler,F)  Answer to Affirmative Defenses, Filed	
	(Clerk: Tyler,F)  Answer to Complaint-with Jury Demand, Filed	
	Proof of Service, Filed; Affirmative Defenses, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F) Witness List, Filed	
02/25/2013	Proof of Service, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)  Affirmative Defenses, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)	
03/11/2013	Appearance of Attorney, Filed  (Clerk: Tyler,F)	
03/26/2013	Motion to Extend Time, Filed  Fee: \$20.00 Paid; Brief, Filed; Proof of Service, Filed; Notice of Hearing, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)	
	Notice of Hearing, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)	
	Praecipe, Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D. ) Notice of Hearing, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)	
04/19/2013	Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories, Filed	
04/22/2013	Fee: \$20.00 Paid; Brief, Filed; Proof of Service, Filed; Notice of Hearing, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)  Motion to Consolidate, Filed  Fee: \$20.00 Paid; Brief, Filed; Proof of Service, Filed; Notice of Hearing, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)	
	Praecipe, Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)	

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WINDELED MONON HOURING (0.00 Firm) (Dudition Officer Dormain, Outdoor D.)
                                                                                              Exhibit Dpg. 2
             Scheduling Error
             Scheduling Error
               04/12/2013 Reset by Court to 04/26/2013
04/29/2013 Miscellaneous Motion, Filed
             Fee: $20.00 Paid; Brief, Filed; Proof of Service, Filed; Notice of Hearing, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)
04/30/2013 Motion to Compel Action, Filed
             Fee: $20.00 Paid; Brief, Filed; Proof of Service, Filed; Notice of Hearing, Filed (Clerk: Tyler,F)
05/01/2013 Praecipe, Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
05/02/2013 Status Conference (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)
               04/15/2013 Reset by Court to 04/19/2013
               04/19/2013 Reset by Court to 04/23/2013
               04/23/2013 Reset by Court to 05/02/2013
            Result: Held
05/02/2013 Motion Hearing (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)
             Plaintiff - Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance
               04/12/2013 Reset by Court to 04/26/2013
               04/26/2013 Reset by Court to 05/03/2013
               05/03/2013 Reset by Court to 05/02/2013
            Result: Held
05/02/2013 Motion Hearing (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)
              Defendant Efficient Design - Motion to Compel Discovery From Plaintiff
               05/10/2013 Reset by Court to 05/02/2013
            Result: Held
05/02/2013 Status Conference Scheduling Order, Signed and Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D. )
             s/c 12-10, w/l 7-11, disc 10-13, ce 10-28, 2nd s/c 12-16 (Clerk: Smith,P)
05/02/2013 Motion Denied, Order to Follow (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
              denied continuance (Clerk: Smith,P)
05/02/2013 Motion to Compel Action Granted, Order to Follow (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
              (Clerk: Smith,P)
05/02/2013 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney Granted, Order to Follow (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D. )
             (Clerk: Smith,P)
05/02/2013 Status Conference Scheduling Order, Signed and Filed
              (Clerk: Tyler,F)
05/02/2013 Status Conference Scheduling Order, Signed and Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
05/03/2013 CANCELED Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)
              Dismiss Hearing or Injunction
              Dismiss Hearing or Injunction
05/03/2013 Appearance of Attorney, Filed
              (Clerk: Tyler,F)
05/03/2013 Order for Miscellaneous Action, Signed and Filed
              (Clerk: Tyler,F)
05/06/2013 Settlement Conference Scheduled
              (Clerk: Fowler, R)
05/06/2013 Notice of Hearing, Filed
              (Clerk: Tyler,F)
05/10/2013 Notice of Hearing, Filed
              (Clerk: Tyler,F)
06/06/2013 Answer to Motion, Filed
              (Clerk: Tyler,F)
06/10/2013 Notice of Hearing, Filed
              (Clerk: Tyler,F)
06/14/2013 Motion to Vacate Order, Filed
              Fee: $20.00 PAID (Clerk: Tyler,F)
06/14/2013 Motion to Compel Action, Filed
              Fee: $20.00 Paid; Brief, Filed; Proof of Service, Filed; Notice of Hearing, Filed (Clerk: Tyler.F)
06/17/2013 Answer to Motion, Filed
              (Clerk: Tyler,F)
 06/17/2013 Answer to Motion, Filed
              (Clerk: Tyler,F)
06/18/2013 Answer to Motion, Filed
              (Clerk: Tyler,F)
06/19/2013 Answer to Motion, Filed
              (Clerk: Tyler,F)
 06/19/2013 Praecipe, Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 06/19/2013 Praecipe, Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 06/19/2013 Praecipe, Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
06/19/2013 Answer to Motion, Filed
        (Clerk: Tyler,F)
```

10/23/2013 Case Evaluation - General Civil (Clerk: Fowler,R)

12/10/2013 Settlement Conference (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)

REGISTER OF ACTIONS
CASE No. 13-000652-NI

	Related Case Information	
Related Case	es	-
11-014149-	NF (Prior Action)	
Defendant	CULPERT, KEVIN THOMAS	Lead Attorneys Ahmed M. Hassouna Retained (248) 764-1210(W)
Defendant	EFFICIENT DESIGN, INC.	James C. Wright Retained (248) 851-4111(W)
Plaintiff	Filas, Tamara	Pro Se
Plaintiff	FILAS, TAMARA	Daryle G. Salisbury Retained (248) 348-6820(W)
	EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT	
01/14/2013 S 01/14/2013 S 01/14/2013 O 01/14/2013 O 02/06/2013 P 02/07/2013 P 02/12/2013 P 02/19/2013 P 02/19/2013 P 02/20/2013 P 02/20/2013 P 02/20/2013 P 03/11/2013 P 03/26/2013 P 04/03/2013 P 04/04/2013 P	ervice Review Scheduled tatus Conference Scheduled ase Filing Fee - Paid omplaint, Filed inswer to Complaint-with Jury Demand, Filed roof of Service, Filed equest for Admissions, Filed eppearance of Attorney, Filed ervice of Complaint, filed inswer to Affirmative Defenses, Filed inswer to Complaint-with Jury Demand, Filed filmative Defenses, Filed iffirmative Defenses, Filed ippearance of Attorney, Filed lotion to Extend Time, Filed otice of Hearing, Filed otice of Hearing, Filed otice of Hearing, Filed otice of Hearing, Filed	
04/22/2013 N 04/24/2013 F 04/24/2013 N	Iotion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories, Filed Iotion to Consolidate, Filed Iraecipe, Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.) Iotice of Hearing, Filed EANCELED Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.) Scheduling Error 04/12/2013 Reset by Court to 04/26/2013	
04/30/2013 N 05/01/2013 F	Iliscellaneous Motion, Filed Ilotion to Compel Action, Filed Praecipe, Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.) Etatus Conference (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)  04/15/2013 Reset by Court to 04/19/2013	
	04/19/2013 Reset by Court to 04/23/2013 04/23/2013 Reset by Court to 05/02/2013 lesult: Held lotion Hearing (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)	
	04/12/2013 Reset by Court to 04/26/2013 04/26/2013 Reset by Court to 05/03/2013 05/03/2013 Reset by Court to 05/02/2013 desult: Held Iotion Hearing (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)	

https://cmspublic.3rdcc.org/CaseDetail.aspx2CaseID=2300181

05/10/2013 Reset by Court to 05/02/2013

```
1/21/2014
            Result: Held
 05/02/2013 Status Conference Scheduling Order, Signed and Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 05/02/2013 Motion Denied, Order to Follow (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 05/02/2013 Motion to Compel Action Granted, Order to Follow (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 05/02/2013 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney Granted, Order to Follow (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 05/02/2013 Status Conference Scheduling Order, Signed and Filed
 05/02/2013 Status Conference Scheduling Order, Signed and Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 05/03/2013 CANCELED Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)
              Dismiss Hearing or Injunction
 05/03/2013 Appearance of Attorney, Filed
 05/03/2013 Order for Miscellaneous Action, Signed and Filed
 05/06/2013 Settlement Conference Scheduled
 05/06/2013 Notice of Hearing, Filed
 05/10/2013 Notice of Hearing, Filed
 06/06/2013 Answer to Motion, Filed
 06/10/2013 Notice of Hearing, Filed
 06/14/2013 Motion to Vacate Order, Filed
 06/14/2013 Motion to Compel Action, Filed
 06/17/2013 Answer to Motion, Filed
 06/17/2013 Answer to Motion, Filed
 06/18/2013 Answer to Motion, Filed
 06/19/2013 Answer to Motion, Filed
 06/19/2013 Praecipe, Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 06/19/2013 Praecipe, Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 06/19/2013 Praecipe, Filed (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 06/19/2013 Answer to Motion, Filed
 06/21/2013 Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)
 06/21/2013 Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)
            Result: Held
 06/21/2013 Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)
               06/28/2013 Reset by Court to 06/21/2013
 06/21/2013 Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)
               06/28/2013 Reset by Court to 06/21/2013
            Result: Held
 06/21/2013 Order for Miscellaneous Action, Signed and Filed
 06/21/2013 Motion to Compel Action Granted, Order to Follow (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 06/21/2013 Motion to Compel Action Granted, Order to Follow (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 06/21/2013 Motion for Discovery Granted, Order to Follow (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 06/21/2013 Motion Denied, Order to Follow (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 06/21/2013 Witness List, Filed
 06/24/2013 Case Evaluation - General Civil
 06/24/2013 Special Conference (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)
 06/24/2013 Closed - Case Dismissed, Order to Follow (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 06/25/2013 Notice of Presentment
 06/28/2013 Motion Transcript Ordered
 07/02/2013 Objection to 7-Day Order, Filed
 07/05/2013 Notice of Hearing, Filed
 07/09/2013 Notice of Hearing, Filed
 07/09/2013 Transcript, Filed
 07/11/2013 Witness List, Filed
 07/16/2013 Answer to Objection, Filed
 07/19/2013 Notice of Hearing, Filed
 07/22/2013 Concurrence, Filed
 08/07/2013 Proof of Service, Filed
 08/07/2013 Reply to Answer, Filed
 08/07/2013 Concurrence, Filed
 08/09/2013 Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)
               07/24/2013 Reset by Court to 08/09/2013
            Result: Held
 08/09/2013 Motion Denied, Order to Follow (Judicial Officer: Borman, Susan D.)
 08/09/2013 Final - Order of Dismissal, Signed and Filed
 08/30/2013 Transcript, Filed
 12/10/2013 CANCELED Settlement Conference (9:30 AM) (Judicial Officer Borman, Susan D.)
              Case Disposed/Order Previously Entered
 01/17/2014 Letter, Filed
```



### Exhibit E

### Exhibit E



## Exhibit F

### Exhibit F

#### STATE OF MICHIGAN

#### IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF WAYNE

TAMARA FILAS,

Plaintiff,

٧.

Case No. 13-000652-NI Honorable Susan D. Borman

KEVIN THOMAS CULPERT and EFFICIENT DESIGN, INC... A Michigan Corporation,

Defendants.

TAMARA FILAS

In Pro Per

6477 Edgewood Road

Canton, MI 48187

JAMES C. WRIGHT (P67613)

Zausmer, Kaufman, August & Caldwell, P.C.

Attorneys for Defendant Efficient Design

31700 Middlebelt Road, Suite 150

Farmington Hills, MI 48334

(248) 851-4111//fax (248) 851-0100

iwright@zkac.com

AHMED M. HASSOUNA (P67995)

Law Offices of Mark E. Williams

Attorney for Defendant Culpert

340 E. Big Beaver, Suite 250

Troy, MI 48083

(248) 764-1127

Ahmed M Hassouna@Progressive.com

MICHAEL CHARLES O'MALLEY (P59108)

Vandeveer Garzia

Co-Counsel for Defendant Efficient Design

1450 W Long Lake Road, Suite 100

Troy, MI 48098

(248) 312-2940//fax (248) 267-1242

momalley@vgpclaw.com

### DEFENDANT EFFICIENT DESIGN, INC.'S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF **DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF**

NOW COMES the Defendant, Efficient Design, Inc., by and through its attorneys, Zausmer, Kaufman, August & Caldwell, P.C., hereby requests production of documents from Plaintiff pursuant to MCR 2.310, to be delivered to our office within twenty-eight (28) days after service of this request.

The following documents are requested:

## Exhibit J

### Mandatory Creation of or Use of SCAO-Approved Forms

The following lists identify court forms that are required by court rule or statute to be: 1) approved by the SCAO; 2) used as approved by the SCAO; or 3) used in a form substantially in the form approved by the SCAO.

#### FORMS SCAO HAS BEEN MANDATED TO CREATE AND APPROVE - USE NOT MANDATORY

Although these forms are SCAO-Approved, their use is not specifically mandated by court rule or statute. Forms are denoted with an asterisk (\*) when court rule or statute requires the use of a form substantially in the form of the SCAO-Approved form. In this particular chart, MC forms are for use in circuit, district, and probate courts; DC forms are for use in district courts, FOC forms are for use in friend of the court offices and circuit courts, and PC forms are for use in family divisions of circuit court.

- MC 12\*, Request and Writ for Garnishment (Periodic), MCR 3.101(C)
- MC 13\*, Request and Writ for Garnishment (Nonperiodic), MCR 3.101(C)
- MC 14\*, Garnishee Disclosure, MCR 3.101(C)
- MC 15, Motion for Installment Payments, MCR 3.101(C)
- MC 15a, Order Regarding Installment Payments, MCR 3.101(C)
- MC 16, Motion to Set Aside Order for Installment Payments, MCR 3.101(C)
- MC 16a, Order on Motion to Set Aside Order for Installment Payments, MCR 3.101(C)
- MC 48, Final Statement on Garnishment of Periodic Payments, MCR 3.101(C)
- MC 49, Objections to Garnishment and Notice of Hearing, MCR 3.101(C)
- MC 50, Garnishment Release, MCR 3.101(C)
- MC 51, Order on Objections to Garnishment, MCR 3.101(C)
- MC 52\*, Request and Writ for Garnishment (Income Tax Refund/Credit), MCR 3.101(C)
- MC 203\*, Writ of Habeas Corpus, MCR 3.303(H) and MCR 3.304(D)
- MC 258\*, Report of Nonpayment of Restitution, MCL 712A.30(18), MCL 780.766(18), MCL 780.794(18), and MCL 780.826(15)
- MC 288\*, Order to Remit Prisoner Funds for Fines, Costs, and Assessments, MCL 769.11
- MC 292\*, Disclosure of Employment or Contract in Michigan Public System, MCL 380.1230d(2)
- DC 84\*, Affidavit and Claim, Small Claims, MCR 4.302(A), MCL 600.8401a, and MCL 600.8402
- FOC 50, Motion Regarding Support, MCL 552.505(1)(d) and MCL 552.519(3)(a)(v)
- FOC 51, Response to Motion Regarding Support, MCL 552.505(1)(d) and MCL 552.519(3)(a)(v)
- FOC 65, Motion Regarding Parenting Time, MCL 552.505(1)(d) and MCL 552.519(3)(a)(v)
- FOC 66, Response to Motion Regarding Parenting Time, MCL 552.505(1)(d) and MCL 552.519(3)(a)(v)
- FOC 67, Order Regarding Parenting Time, MCL 552.505(1)(d) and MCL 552.519(3)(a)(v)
- FOC 87, Motion Regarding Custody, MCL 552.505(1)(d) and MCL 552.519(3)(a)(v)
- FOC 88, Response to Motion Regarding Custody, MCL 552.505(1)(d) and MCL 552.519(3)(a)(v)
- FOC 89, Order Regarding Custody and Parenting Time, MCL 552.505(1)(d) and MCL 552.519(3)(a)(v)

### FORMS SCAO HAS BEEN MANDATED TO CREATE AND APPROVE - USE NOT MANDATORY (continued)

- PC 117\*, Notice to Minor of Rights Regarding Waiver of Parental Consent for an Abortion, MCR 3.615(C), (D)
- PC 118\*, Request and Order for Court Appointed Attorney /Guardian Ad Litem for Waiver of Parental Consent, MCR 3.615(C), (D)
- PC 119\*, Petition for Waiver of Parental Consent for an Abortion, MCR 3.615(C), (D)
- PC 121\*, Appeal of Order Denying Petition for Waiver of Parental Consent, MCR 3.165(K)
- PC 122\*, Confidential Information for Proceedings Concerning Waiver of Parental Consent, MCR 3.615(C), (D)

### FORMS SCAO HAS CREATED AND APPROVED - USE MANDATORY

The use of these SCAO-Approved forms, without modification, is mandated by court rule or statute. In this particular chart, MC and UC forms are for use in circuit, district, and probate courts; DC forms are for use in district courts, CC forms are for use in circuit courts, and FOC forms are for use in friend of the court offices and circuit courts.

All estate, trust, guardianship, conservatorship, and mental commitment forms, MCL 600.855 ansd MCL 700.3983

DCI-84, Collecting Money from a Small Claims Judgment, MCL 600.8409(2)

UC 01a and UC 01b, Uniform Law Citation, MCL 257.727c, MCL 600.8705, MCL 600.8805, and MCL 764.9f

MC 11, Subpoena (Order to Appear), MCR 2.506(D)(1)

MC 240, Order for Custody, MCR 6.106(B)(4)

- MC 315, Authorization for Release of Medical Information, MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d) and MCR 2.314(D)(2)(b)
  - CC 375, Petition for Personal Protection Order (Domestic Relationship), MCL 600.2950b(1)
  - CC 375M, Petition for Personal Protection Order Against Minor (Domestic Relationship), MCL 600.2950b(1)
  - CC 376, Personal Protection Order (Domestic Relationship), MCL 600.2950b(2)
  - CC 376M, Personal Protection Order Against Minor (Domestic Relationship), MCL 600.2950b(2)
  - CC 377, Petition for Personal Protection Order Against Stalking, MCL 600.2950b(1)
  - CC 377M, Petition for Personal Protection Order Against Stalking by a Minor, MCL 600.2950b(1)
  - CC 379, Motion to Modify, Extend, or Terminate Personal Protection Order, MCL 600.2950b(3)
  - CC 380, Personal Protection Order Against Stalking, MCL 600.2950b(2)
  - CC 380M, Personal Protection Order Against Stalking by a Minor, MCL 600.2950b(2)
  - CC 381, Notice of Hearing on Petition for Personal Protection Order, MCL 600,2950b(1)
  - CC 391, Advice of Rights (Circuit Court Plea), MCR 6.302(B)
  - FOC 10/52, Uniform Child Support Order, MCR 3.211(D)
  - FOC 10a/52a, Uniform Child Support Order (No Friend of Court Services), MCR 3.211(D)
  - FOC 10b, Uniform Spousal Support Order, MCR 3.211(D)
  - FOC 10c, Uniform Spousal Support Order (No Friend of Court Services), MCR 3.211(D)
  - FOC 101, Advice of Rights Regarding Use of Friend of the Court Services, MCL 552.505a(8)

### Exhibit K

Approved, SCAO

### STATE OF MICHIGAN

CASE NO.

JUDICIAL DISTRICT JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COUNTY PROBATE	AUTHORIZATION OF MEDICAL II		5/62 1151
Court address			Court telephone no.
Plaintiff	v	Defendant	
Probate In the matter of			
1. Patient's name  2. Lauthorize		Date of birth	
Name and address of doctor, ho	spital, or other custodian of me	dical information	
to release	tion to be released (include da	ates where appropriate)	
accompanied by the certificate on I understand that medical information information about HIV, AIDS, ARC, a  4. This authorization is valid for 60 days the lawsuit listed above for their use in my mental or physical condition is in	direct otherwise:  al information reasonably questing party the origina the reverse side of this an may include records, if and any other communication and is signed to make meany stage of the lawsuit. To controversy in the lawsuit.	al information or a true a nuthorization. any, on alcohol and dru able disease. edical information regar the medical information of iit.	n and copying, or and exact copy of the original information ag abuse, psychology, social work, and ding me available to the other party(ies) to covered by this release is relevant because ormation to be redisclosed by the recipient.
6. I understand that I may revoke this a	uthorization, except to th	ne extent action has alre	
Signature		Address	
Name (type or print) (If signing as Personal Repunder what authority you are acting)	resentative, please state	City, state, zip	Telephone no.

#### CERTIFICATE

1. I am the custodian of medical information for			
Organi	ization		
2. I received the attached authorization for release of m	nedical information on	Date .	
3. I have examined the original medical information reginformation that was described in the authorization.	garding this patient and	have attached a true and complete copy	of the
4. This certificate is made in accordance with Michigan	n Court Rule.		
I declare that the statements above are true to the best	t of my information, kno	owledge, and belief.	
Date	Signature		
	Name (type or prin	nt)	
	Address		
	City, state, zip	7	Telephone no

## Exhibit L

## Law Offices of Williams & Baranski 340 E. Big Beaver Road, Ste. 250 Trou, MI 48083 (248) 764-1127

#### STATE OF MICHIGAN

#### IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF WAYNE

TAMARA FILAS.

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13-000652-NI HON. SUSAN D. BORMAN

-VS-

KEVIN THOMAS CULPERT, AND EFFICIENT DESIGN, INC., A MICHIGAN CORPORATION.

Defendant.

13-000652-NI

FILED IN MY OFFICE WAYNE COUNTY CLERK 7/22/2013 11:03:08 AM CATHY M. GARRETT

TAMARA FILAS In Pro Per 6477 Edgewood Road Canton, MI 48187 MICHAEL C. O'MALLEY (P59108)
Co-Counsel for Defendant Efficient Design
1450 W. Long Lake Rd., Ste. 100
Troy, MI 48098
248-312-2940

AHMED M. HASSOUNA (P67995) Attorney for DefendantCulpert 340 E. Big Beaver, Suite 250 Troy, MI 48083 248-764-1127 JAMES C. WRIGHT (P67613) Attorney for Defendant Efficient Design 31700 Middlebelt Road, Ste. 150 Farmington Hills, MI 48334 (248) 851-4111 / 0100 (Fax)

CONCURRENCE IN DEFENDANT EFFICIENT DESIGN, INC.'S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT EFFICIENT DESIGN, INC.'S PROPOSED ORDER OF DSMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE

NOW COMES the Defendant, KEVIN THOMAS CULPERT, by and through his attorneys, LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAMS & BARANSKI, by AHMED M. HASSOUNA, who concurs with Defendant EFFICIENT DESIGN, INC.'S RESPONSE to Plaintiff's Objection to

Law Offices of Williams & Baranski 340 E. Big Beaver Road, Ste. 250 Trou, MI 48083 (248) 764-1127 Dated: July 22, 2013

its Proposed Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice filed with this Honorable Court in this matter.

Respectfully submitted,

#### LAW OFFICES OF WILLIAMS & BARANSKI

/s/ Ahmed M. Hassouna

BY:

AHMED M. HASSOUNA (P67995)

Attorney for Defendant

## Exhibit M



#### FW: Filas: 3RD PARTY RELEASE,7-19-2012

Terry Cochran < TCochran@cochranfoley.com>

Thu, Jul 19, 2012 at 9:30 AM

To: Tamara Filas's e-mail redacted

Dear Ms Filas.

Please find attached Def Culpert's release consistent with his offer to settle. After I received the release, I called Attorney Hassouna and asked if he had spoken to his Clt about the other two conditions outlined in my prior e-mail. Attorney Hassouna indicated that he had draft answers to our interrogatories and that Mr. Culpert was on his way to work but was not in the scope and course of his employment at the time of the accident. In addition, he is checking to make sure that Mr. Culpert is the sole owner of the vehicle.

Thank you,

Terry L. Cochran
Cochran, Foley & Associates, P.C.
15510 Farmington Road
Livonia, Michigan 48154
(734) 425-2400
tcochran@cochranfoley.com

From: Ahmed M Hassouna [mailto:Ahmed\_M\_Hassouna@Progressive.com]

Sent: Thursday, July 19, 2012 9:18 AM

To: Terry Cochran

Subject: Filas: 3RD PARTY RELEASE,7-19-2012

Terry:

Please see attached. Please advise as to whether your client will execute the attached Release in order to fully resolve this matter. Thanks.

Best.

-A

Ahmed M. Hassouna, Esq.

Law Offices of Mark E. Williams

Salaried Employees of Progressive Casualty Insurance Company

#### RELEASE

For the Sole Consideration of TWENTY THOUSAND AND 00100 (\$20,000,00) DOLLARS, the receipt and sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned hereby releases and forever discharges KEVIN THOMAS CULPERT, his heirs, executors, administrators, agents and assigns claimed liable or who might be claimed to be liable, none of whom admit any liability to the undersigned but all expressly deny any liability, from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, and particularly on account of all injuries, known and unknown, both to person and property, which have resulted or may in the future develop from an accident which occurred on or about February 19, 2010 in the City of Romulus, County of Wayne, State of Michigan.

Nothing in this release shall be construed as having any effect on any claims that undersigned releasor may have for first-party no fault benefits under the Michigan No Fault Act, MCL § 500.3101, et seq.

THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY DECLARES AND REPRESENTS that the injuries sustained are or may be permanent or progressive; and that recovery is or may be uncertain or indefinite. In making this Release it is understood and agreed that the undersigned relies wholly upon his own judgment, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent, effects and duration of said injuries and liability. This release is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of the party or parties hereby released, their representatives or by any physician/surgeon that examined undersigned on their behalf.

Undersigned hereby declares that the terms of this settlement have been completely read and are fully understood and voluntarily accepted for the purpose of making a full and final compromise adjustment and settlement of any and all

claims, disputed or otherwise, on account of the injuries and damages above mentioned, and for the express purpose of precluding forever any further or additional claims arising out of the aforesaid accident.

Undersigned hereby accepts draft or drafts as final payment of the
consideration set forth above.
I have hereunto set my hand and seal this day of
, 201
V
TAMARA FILAS, Plaintiff
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 201
NOTARY PUBLIC County, Michigan  My Commission Expires:
IN THE PRESENCE OF TERRY L. COCHRAN, Attorney for the signing party to this Release, who has fully explained the terms of this agreement and acknowledges understanding by the signing party as to the finality of the settlement and the terms thereof against KEVIN THOMAS CULPERT.
TERRY L. COCHRAN (P35890) Attorney for Plaintiff

# Exhibit Y



LYNN M. FOLEY WILLIAM E. GRAY EILEEN E. KROLL CHARLES R. ASH, IV Terri L. Shuttleworth Office Administrator

Martin J. Rodgers, B.S. Legal Investigator

July 16, 2012

#### VIA EMAIL

Ms. Tamara Filas 6477 Edgewood Canton, MI 48187

Re:

Tamara Filas vs. Kevin Thomas Culpert, et al

Our File: 2402-1

#### Hi Tamara:

On July 13, 2012, I received a telephone message from Ahmad Houssouna, Defendant Culpert's attorney, advising that he had received authority from the Progressive Insurance Company to extend an offer to resolve your claim against Defendant Culpert for his applicable policy limits of \$20,000.00. In response, I telephoned Mr. Houssouna and left a voice message that I could not recommend a settlement of \$20,000.00 unless three

- (1)Proof that Defendant Culpert's policy limits are \$20,000.00;
- (2)A statement from Defendant Culpert that he was the sole owner of the 1997 Suburban at the time of the accident; and
- A statement from Defendant Culpert that he was not within the course and scope of (3)his employment at the time of the accident.

In response to my telephone message, I received an email from Mr. Hassouna attaching a copy of Defendant Progressive Insurance Company's declaration sheet and a short note that he would follow up with his client regarding our two other inquiries.

Please find attached the following documents for your review and consideration as I outline to you your legal position and your options:

- (1)Defendant Culpert's dec sheet;
- (2)Your MEEMIC Insurance Company dec sheet without underinsured motorist protection;

You have the right to pursue Defendant Culpert for damages over and above his policy limit of \$20,000.00. The Progressive Insurance Company has a duty to provide him with a defense of his personal assets. If you decline to accept the policy, you can expect that Mr. Hassouna will vigorously defend Defendant Culpert both procedurally and substantively. Procedurally, you can anticipate that Mr. Hassouna will object to the Motion to Adjourn Trial, a Protective

Ms. Tamara Filas Re: Filas vs. Culpert, et al July 16, 2012

Order and to Extend the Scheduling Order Dates. Substantively, you can expect that Attorney Hassouna to admit liability, but argue that your injuries fail to exceed Michigan's tort threshold that requires that you sustain an objective injury to an important bodily function that adversely affects your normal life. In addition, he will also argue that your injuries are essentially soft tissue with a mild traumatic brain injury and that you have made an excellent recovery.

If you are able to obtain a verdict in excess of \$20,000.00 against Defendant Culpert, you can anticipate that Defendant Culpert may very well explore filing bankruptcy in order to discharge any kind of judgment you may obtain against him.

In addition, I have also reviewed your declaration sheet from the MEEMIC Insurance Company. You did not carry underinsured motorist protection so there is no remedy under your own policy as a result of Defendant Culpert being underinsured.

I have reviewed your medical records that you produced once again. You can expect the Defendants to argue that Dr. Sax had indicated that you could return to work with certain modifications in November, 2010 and that Dr. Ryan who conducted the neuropsychological evaluation found that you were testing in the above average to superior range in many areas even though there was evidence of a mild traumatic brain injury. In other words, the objective medical evidence may not support a long term disability claim as a teacher.

Assuming that Mr. Hassouna can produce a statement from Defendant Culpert indicating that Defendant Culpert has no additional insurance available and was not in the course of his employment at the time of the accident, I recommend that you accept Defendant Culpert's offer of \$20,000.00. After deducting costs and attorney fees, I estimate that you will receive approximately \$12,500.00 that would be tax free.

Sincerely yours,

Terry L. Cochran Attorney at Law

Email: Tcochran@cochranfoley.com

TLC/sm Attachments

# Exhibit Z

# Law Office of Mark E. Williams 38700 Van Dyke, Suite 150 Sterling Heights, MI 48312 (586) 268-2320

STATE OF MICHIGAN

LAS, TAMARA V MEEMIC INSURANCE

11-014149-NF

n. Susan D. Borman

11/15/2011

COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF WAYNE IN THE CIRCUIT

CATHY M GARRETT WAYNE COUNTY CLERK

JUN - 1 2012

-VS-

TAMARA FILAS.

Plaintiff,

PROOF OF SERVICE

THE UNDERSIGNED CERTIFIES THAT A COPY OF THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT WAS SERVED ON THE ATTORNEYS OF RECORD OF ALL PARTIES TO THE ABOVE CAUSE BY MAILING SAME TO THEM AT THEIR RESPECTIVE BUSINESS ADDRESSES AS DISCLOSED BY THE PLEADING OF RECORD HEREIN, WITH POSTAGE FULLY PREPAID THEREON ON 6-1-12

Michelle Lewandowski

THE STATEMENT ABOVE IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION AND BESTIEF.

KEVIN THOMAS CULPERT and MEEMIC INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendants.

TERRY L. COCHRAN (P35890) Attorney for Plaintiff 15510 Farmington Road Livonia, MI 48154 734-425-2400

AHMED M. HASSOUNA (P67995) Attorney for Defendant Culpert 38700 Van Dyke Avenue, Suite 150 Sterling Heights, MI 48312 (586) 268-2320

SIMEON R. ORLOWSKI (P27171) Attorney for Defendant MEEMIC 1111 W. Long Lake Road, Ste. 300 Troy, MI 48098 (248) 641-7600

#### DEFENDANT CULPERT'S FIRST MOTION TO EXTEND ALL SCHEDULING ORDER DATES AND ADJOURNMENT OF CASE EVALUATION & TRIAL

Defendant, KEVIN THOMAS CULPERT, by and through his attorney, Ahmed M. Hassouna, and for his motion, states as follows:

- 1. This is a first-party no-fault claim and third-party automobile negligence claim filed on November 15, 2011, arising out of an accident which occurred on January 15, 2010.
- .2. Defendant Culpert filed an Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Reliance on Jury Demand on or about January 26, 2012.

- 3. On April 9, 2012, undersigned counsel coordinated the setting of Plaintiff's deposition with the parties. The deposition was set to take place on June 4 2012, but was adjourned by plaintiff counsel per a conflict in his schedule. The deposition has been rescheduled for June 29, 2012, the first available date according to the attorneys' schedules.
  - 4. The scheduling order sets discovery cutoff for June 17, 2012.
- Case evaluation in this matter is currently set to take place on July 11,
   IMEs still must be scheduled and undersigned counsel for defendant awaits medical records. Additional depositions of witnesses will also be scheduled.
- 6. As depositions of witnesses have to be taken, no independent information/regarding plaintiff's outstanding claims are available to defendant at this time. Additionally, after plaintiff's deposition, defense counsel will require additional discovery such as records requests, subpoenas and independent medical examinations; all of which will take additional time to obtain and schedule.
- 7. There can be no purposeful or meaningful case evaluation without sufficient and proper discovery.
- 8. The First Settlement Conference has been set for August 14, 2012 and the Second Settlement Conference for August 20, 2012.
  - Trial is scheduled for August 27, 2012.

case #: 200750 ( 2402-1 )

Case Type: NOF Class: LIT DOI: 1/15/2010 Assigned: TLC LIM Date: 1/15/2011 Date Opened: 11/14/2011

Page 1 of 1

7/9/2012 11:52 AM

#### Case Note - Page 57 of 77

Date: 06/29/2012 09:49 PM Staff: TLC

Topic: E-Mail

Case Status

From: Ahmed M Hassouna To: sorlowski@garanlucow.com

CC: Terry Cochran

Subject: Filas: Order of Dismissal Received: 6/29/2012 12:04:05 PM

Sy:

Received your v-mail. Okay to sign my name to a dismissal re: MEEMIC. My claims professional is analyzing the written discovery we have received to date in order to determine whether we will settle the case or simply take an order w/o prejudice. I will keep Terry posted on our progress.

Thanks much. Enjoy the weekend.

Best,

-A

Ahmed M. Hassouna, Esq.
Law Offices of Mark E. Williams
Salaried Employees of Progressive Casualty Insurance Company
38700 Van Dyke Avenue, Suite 150
Sterling Heights, MI 48312
Direct: (586) 268-2285
Network: 448-2285
Cell: (586) 291-4260

Cell: (586) 291-4260 Fax: (586) 274-0163

ahmed\_m\_hassouna@progressive.com<mailto:ahmed\_m\_hassouna@progressive.com>

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## Exhibit DD



#### Michigan Supreme Court

State Court Administrative Office Michigan Hall of Justice P.O. Box 30052 Lansing, Michigan 48909 Phone (517) 373-0128

Chad C. Schmucker State Court Administrator

#### **MEMORANDUM**

DATE: June 23, 2011

TO: Chief Judges

cc: Court Administrators/Clerks

Probate Registers County Clerks

**SCAO** Regional Administrators

FROM: Chad C. Schmucker

RE: SCAO Administrative Memorandum 2011-02

Acceptance of SCAO-Approved Court Forms

We have received some reports of courts refusing to accept SCAO-approved court forms. It has been difficult to determine specifically where this is occurring and whether it is a court policy, a practice of an individual judge, or simple misunderstanding by a court clerk. This memo is intended to clarify what is already the practice of almost all of the courts across the state.

The procedural rules regarding forms are contained in the Case File Management Standards and in MCR 1.109. Case File Management Standards Component 32 states: "Unless specifically required by statute or court rule, the court may not mandate the use of a specific form, whether SCAO-approved or locally developed." MCR 1.109 provides that the court clerk must reject nonconforming papers unless the judge directs otherwise. That same rule states that SCAO-approved forms are conforming papers. Courts may not impose additional procedures beyond those contained in the court rules. Therefore, all courts must accept court forms approved by the Supreme Court or the state court administrator. To mandate the use of a particular local court form, a court must adopt a local court rule for that purpose. The Supreme Court must approve all local court rules.

If you have questions, contact Amy Garoushi at <u>elgaroushia@courts.mi.gov</u> or 517-373-4864, or Traci Gentilozzi at gentilozzit@courts.mi.gov or 517-373-2217.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Credit Acceptance Corporation v 46th District Court, 481 Mich 883 (2008) affirming In Re: Credit Acceptance Corporation, 273 Mich App 594 (2007). MCR 8.112 requires that a court adopt a local court rule approved by the Supreme Court to authorize any practice that is not specifically authorized by the rules.

Home Administration State Court Administrative Office

#### Court Forms

#### SCAO-Approved Court Forms

#### Developing and Revising Court Forms

The Trial Court Services Division of the State Court Administrative Office is responsible for developing, revising, approving, and distributing court forms. Part of this process includes review and recommendation by the Michigan Court Forms Committee. The committee is comprised of ten works groups that include representatives from trial court associations, sections of the State Bar of Michigan, and state departments or agencies. The work groups meet annually to discuss requests for new forms and suggestions to revise existing forms received by the Trial Court Services Division.

Requests for new or revised forms are published on this website for a 30-day comment period. Comments received during this publication period are provided to the Michigan Court Forms Committee for discussion at its meetings. See Proposals for Comment for details.

New forms and changes to existing forms approved by the committee are recommended to the State Court Administrator for final approval. Forms approved by the State Court Administrator are then distributed to trial courts, printers, publishers, and state departments and are posted on this website. See Recently Revised Forms.

For additional details on the forms process, see Section 8-06, State Court Administrative Office Forms, in the Michigan Court Administration Reference Guide.

#### Revising the Uniform Law Citation

Courts that want to revise the Uniform Law Citation for local purposes must submit a draft to the Trial Court Services Division for review. If the revision is approved by the State Court Administrator, the draft will be forwarded to the Attorney General, Secretary of State, and Director of Michigan State Police for approval as required by Michigan law. Click here for more information.

#### COMMENTS AND REQUESTS

Any interested person may request that a new form be developed or an existing form be revised. Comments and requests may be made by mail, telephone, or email.

SCAO-Approved Court Forms PO Box 30048 Lansing, Michigan 48909 Phone: (517) 373-2217 CourtFormsInfo@courts.mi.gov



WHERE TO ORDER PAPER FORMS

Uniform Law Citation Printers

Printers and Publishers

#### Developing and Revising Court Forms

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**EDUCATION & REFERENCES** 

NEWS & E

A Print C SHARE

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## Exhibit EE

#### STATE OF MICHIGAN

#### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TAMARA FILAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Court of Appeals No: 317972

Circuit Court No: 13-000652-NI

-vs-

KEVIN THOMAS CULPERT, AND EFFICIENT DESIGN, INC., A Michigan Corporation.

#### Defendants-Appellees.

TAMARA FILAS	MICHAEL C. O'MALLEY (P59108)
Plaintiff-Appellant	Attorney for Defendant Efficient Design
6477 Edgewood Rd.	Vandeveer Garzia
Canton, MI 48187	1450 W. Long Lake Rd., Suite 100
(734) 751-0103	Troy, MI 48098
e-mail redacted	(248) 312-2940
a tradit a desare to de	momalley@vgpclaw.com
DREW W. BROADDUS (P64658)	JAMES C. WRIGHT (P67613)
Attorney for Defendant Culpert	Attorney for Defendant Efficient Design
Secrest Wardle	Zausmer, Kaufman, August & Caldwell, P.C.
2600 Troy Center Drive, P.O. Box 5025	31700 Middlebelt Rd., Suite 150
Troy, MI 48007-5025	Farmington Hills, MI 48334
(616) 272-7966	(248) 851-4111
dbroaddus@secrestwardle.com	jwright@zkact.com

### PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE THOMAS K. CULPERT'S MOTION TO AFFIRM

\*\*\*ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED\*\*\*

Plaintiff-Appellant, Tamara Filas, for her answer to Defendant-Appellee Thomas K.

Culpert's Motion to Affirm, states the following:

- 1. Denied. Appellant denies that the questions sought to be reviewed in her appeal are unsubstantial and need no argument or formal submission, and denies that the questions sought to be reviewed were not timely or properly raised.
- 2. Denied, for reasons explained in the attached Answer to Defendant-Appellee's Brief.
- 3. Denied. No precedent would be required for a case in which clear and unambiguous court rule, MCR 2.314(C)(1), has been violated by the Circuit Court's ruling to dismiss Plaintiff-Appellant's case based on the court's refusal to allow Plaintiff-Appellant to provide her medical records to the Defendant-Appellees in the method(s) provided for under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) and/or MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d). See attached Answer to Defendant-Appellee's Brief for further explanation.
- 4. Admits that "as an intermediate appellate court, the principal function of this Court of Appeals is to correct errors made by lower courts." Denies that "Since Plaintiff has not cited any precedents contrary to the trial court's decision, it is impossible to say that the trial court erred." Plaintiff-Appellant contends no precedent would be required to determine whether the trial court erred because this case involves the trial court's violation of a clear and unambiguous court rule, MCR 2.314(C)(1).
- 5. Denied. Plaintiff's <u>principal</u> argument on appeal was not "that the trial court ordered her to sign authorizations that were inconsistent with the 'SCΛO-mandated' forms," Although Plaintiff-Appellant did argue that she cannot be required to sign forms that differed from the State Court Administrative Office, Plaintiff-Appellant's <u>principal</u> argument on appeal was that she had met her legal obligation to provide her medical records to the Defendants under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) and/or MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d)

when she sent copies of SCAO-mandated Form 315 to her health care providers so both Defendants, Kevin Culpert, and Efficient Design, Inc. would receive copies of medical records from all of the providers she listed in her answers to both Defendants' interrogatories.

Mr. Hassouna's 4-19-13 Motion to Compel asks for an "Order compelling the Plaintiff to provide signed, notarized, and full and complete answers to interrogatories and fully executed medical authorizations for all providers listed in plaintiff's answers to interrogatories" (Exhibit I, 4-19-13 Defendant's Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories & Production of Documents). On June 21, 2013, to meet Mr. Hassouna's request for production of medical records, Plaintiff provided Mr. Hassouna, with signed copies of SCAO-mandated MC 315 authorization forms for her healthcare providers, and copies of certificates of mailing verifying the forms had been mailed to her health care providers on June 19, 2013, and thereby showing the forms were fully executed per Mr. Hassouna's instructions. Mr. Hassouna indicated these interrogatories she provided him and the SCAO authorizations forms she gave him along with the certificates of mailing were acceptable.

With regard to the production of medical records for Mr. Wright, Defendant Efficient Design's Motion to Compel was based on their request for production of "copies of any and all medical records relating to injuries received as a result of the subject accident", (Exhibit A, relevant page from Efficient Design's Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff dated 2-7-13, but mailed 4-30-13). At 11:24 a.m. on June 24, 2013, Plaintiff-Appellant delivered to Mr. Wright's office, copies of signed SCAO MC 315 authorization forms for her healthcare providers, and copies of

certificates of mailing verifying they had been mailed to her health care providers on June 21, 2013.

Plaintiff-Appellant not only provided Mr. Wright with authorization forms that were sent to healthcare providers that treated her as a result of injuries received in the 1-15-10 auto accident, but also provided him with records from all of the healthcare providers she could recall that she ever obtained services from, prior to the accident. Mr. Wright's Motion to Compel.

Let it be clear that at the August 9, 2013 hearing, Plaintiff-Appellant began to raise her issues regarding Mr. Wright's authorization forms which were not received by Plaintiff-Appellant until after she had already completed and mailed out MC 315 forms to her health care providers, and that the Judge did not permit Plaintiff to state her arguments concerning Mr. Wright's forms on the record. Plaintiff contends Judge Borman did not allow Plaintiff to speak about her issues regarding the authorization forms from Mr. Wright at the 8-9-13 hearing because Judge Borman had already ruled to dismiss Plaintiff's separate first-party case on April 26, 2013, based upon Plaintiff's refusal to release her medical records to a third-party records copying service instead of directly to the defendant, MEEMIC's attorney, from records copied by the custodian of the records of her health care providers, for Mr. Orlowski (Exhibit P, 8-9-13 transcript, pg. 3-4, showing Ms. Filas was not permitted to present her arguments regarding Mr. Wright's forms). The dismissal of the first-party case was appealed to the Court of Appeals on June 20, 2103.

Let it be clear that Plaintiff-Appellant has never refused to provide medical records to the Defendants in the separately filed first-party case filed 12-18-12, or the

third-party tort case filed on January 14, 2013. If Plaintiff-Appellant objected to privileged records that were requested that were not included on the SCAO form, they would have been psychiatric records. Plaintiff-Appellant did object objected to disclosing her records to a party that had not yet, to the best of her knowledge, been determined to be liable for damages (Efficient Design), and still does not believe she should have been ordered to disclose her records to Efficient Design until it was determined they were liable for damages, but she complied with the Order to Compel and provided authorizations to Efficient Design Attorney, Mr. Wright, for him to receive her medical records despite her objection, in an attempt to avoid her claims against Efficient Design from being dismissed from her third party case on June 24, 2013. She did not expect the entire third party case, including claims against Kevin Culpert, to be dismissed as well, since Mr. Hassuona had already been given all discovery materials he had requested by June 21, 2013. Plaintiff-Appellant continues to take the position that Kevin Culpert had no grounds to have his case dismissed and his concurrence with Efficient Design case being dismissed has no legal weight or relevance as an argument to dismiss the Efficient Design case or to claim the Kevin Culpert's case should also be dismissed.

- 6. Admitted. However, Plaintiff does not consider herself to have raised any new arguments in her appeal that were not already raised before the same judge, and previously ruled upon in the trial court.
- 7. Denied. As stated at the bottom of page 38 of Appellant's brief, "as explained above, issues A-C above were preserved in her <u>first-party case</u> against MEEMIC Insurance Company before the same judge, now being appealed to the Court of Appeals, Case

#316822, as documented below." A claim of appeal was filed with the Appellate

Court on June 20, 2013 in regard to Judge Borman's dismissal of Plaintiff's first party
case because Plaintiff would not sign the forms Judge Borman ordered her to sign.

The reason Plaintiff-Appellant refers to filings from the first-party case is because the
judge did not allow her to provide oral arguments in regards to Plaintiff's issues with
the medical authorization forms she was being asked to sign in the third-party case. If
Plaintiff had filed a motion for reconsideration in the third-party case, although she
could have discussed her objections to the medical authorization forms in writing, she
likely would have been accused by the judge of filing a frivolous motion for the fact
that the judge told her that she already ruled on this issue in the first-party case and
that she wasn't reconsidering it, just moments before dismissing her third-party case
(Exhibit P, 8-9-13 transcript pg. 3-4, showing Ms. Filas was not permitted to present
her arguments regarding Mr. Wright's forms).

Defendant-Appellee states that, "[w]here an issue is first presented in a motion for reconsideration, it is not properly preserved." Let it be clear that on page 39 of Appellant's Brief, Plaintiff-Appellant refers not only to her 5-17-13 Motion for Reconsideration filed in the first-party case, but also to her 3-11-13 Emergency Motion to Substitute Forms, where the issues were originally raised. The re-filed MEEMIC case was initially assigned to the wrong court or Judge Murphy instead of Judge Borman. Plaintiff's scheduled hearing for her 3-11-13 Motion was not held, and instead, Judge Murphy made an order on 3-15-13 without allowing the parties to present oral arguments. On 3-19-13, the case was re-assigned to the proper

courtroom of Judge Borman by the Presiding Judge (Exhibit Q, 3-19-13 Order Reassigning Case from Murphy to Borman's Court).

Tamara Filas
6477 Edgewood
Canton, MI 48187
(734) 751-0103

e-mail redacted

#### STATE OF MICHIGAN

#### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TAMARA FILAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Court of Appeals No: 317972

Circuit Court No: 13-000652-NI

-vs-

KEVIN THOMAS CULPERT, AND EFFICIENT DESIGN, INC., A Michigan Corporation.

#### Defendants-Appellees.

TAMARA FILAS	MICHAEL C. O'MALLEY (P59108)
Plaintiff-Appellant	Attorney for Defendant Efficient Design
6477 Edgewood Rd.	Vandeveer Garzia
Canton, MI 48187	1450 W. Long Lake Rd., Suite 100
(734) 751-0103	Troy, MI 48098
e-mail redacted	(248) 312-2940
	momalley@vgpclaw.com
	, 5 61
DREW W. BROADDUS (P64658)	JAMES C. WRIGHT (P67613)
Attorney for Defendant Culpert	Attorney for Defendant Efficient Design
Secrest Wardle	Zausmer, Kaufman, August & Caldwell, P.C.
2600 Troy Center Drive, P.O. Box 5025	31700 Middlebelt Rd., Suite 150
Troy, MI 48007-5025	Farmington Hills, MI 48334
(616) 272-7966	(248) 851-4111
dbroaddus@secrestwardle.com	iwright@zkact.com

## PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S ANSWER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLEE THOMAS K. CULPERT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF HIS MOTION TO AFFIRM

\*\*\*ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED\*\*\*

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<ul> <li>Relevant page of Mr. Wright's 2-5-13 Answer to Complaint against Efficient Design stating Culpert was not an agent of Efficient Design and was not in the course and scope of his employment when the alleged accident occurred</li> </ul>	В
Signed cover letter verifying authorizations were received by Mr. Wright's law firm at 11:24 AM on 6-24-13	

•	Register of Actions dated 6-24-13 and 1-21-14
•	6-24-13 FedEx time/date stamped envelope, stamped 3:00 PM
•	First page of Efficient Design's Request for Production dated 6-21-13 F
•	Accountings of Disclosure from Plaintiff-Appellant's three main health care providers
•	8-2-13 e-mail from Ms. Filas to Mr. Hassouna, Mr. Wright and Mr. O'Malley; and Mr. Hassouna's response
•	4-19-13 Defendant's Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories & Production of Documents
•	List of SCAO-mandated forms
•	SCAO-mandated form MC 315K
•	7-22-13 Culpert's Concurrence with Efficient Design's Response to Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Order of DismissalL
•	7-19-12 e-mail from Terry Cochran and attached settlement offer from Mr. Hassouna
•	Scheduling order for initial consolidated first- and third-party cases showing Discovery Cutoff of 6-17-12
•	Sample of one of Mr. Wright's HIPAA Privacy Authorization forms O
•	8-19-13 transcript, pg. 3-4, showing Ms. Filas was not permitted to present her arguments regarding Mr. Wright's forms
•	3-19-13 Order Reassigning Case from Murphy to Borman's CourtQ
•	2-21-13 and 3-8-13 e-mails from Salisbury to Filas
•	3-8-13 letter of dismissal from Filas to Salisbury

•	3-19-13 request for extension to complete interrogatories, e-mailed from Filas to Hassouna and Mr. O'Malley, and their responses
•	4-15-13 letter from Wright to Filas regarding Substitution of Attorney Order
•	Salisbury's 4-29-13 Motion to Enter Substitution of Attorney Order V
•	5-1-13 and 5-23-13 Register of Actions
•	5-3-13 Order Discharging Daryle Salisbury and granting 30-day stay on Discovery
•,	7-16-12 letter from Cochran to Ms. Filas regarding settlement from Hassouna
•	6-1-13 Culpert's Motion to Extend Scheduling Dates stating he had no medical records for Plaintiff, 6-29-13 e-mail from Hassouna to Orlowski to determine if he will settle based on written discovery from Plaintiff (interrogatories).
•	pages 9-10 of 6-21-13 transcript
•	6-24-13 phone and caller ID records, 8-5-13 affidavit of Kathleen Filas BB
•	4-26-13 transcript from dismissal of MEEMIC case, pg. 4-5
•	6-23-11 Memorandum from Chad C. Schmucker, State Court Administrator

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# DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S COUNTER-STATEMENT OF QUESTION INVOLVED IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT HAND AND MISREPRESENTS THE FACTS

On page vi, Defendant-Appellee presents the following Counter-Statement of Question Involved:

Did the circuit court properly dismiss Plaintiff's lawsuit, where Plaintiff put her medical condition into controversy by filing a personal injury claim, but refused to sign authorizations to release her medical records, and where this tactic - manipulating the physician-patient privilege so as to allow the Plaintiff to selectively disclose relevant evidence - is expressly prohibited by Domako v Rowe and other precedents of the Supreme Court and the court?

Defendant-Appellee's question is irrelevant and inapplicable for the reason that Plaintiff *did* sign authorizations to release her medical records to the Defendants. Prior to the case dismissal on June 24, 2013, she mailed completed SCAO-mandated Form MC 315 medical authorization forms to all of her healthcare providers so that both Defendants, Kevin Culpert and Efficient Design, Inc., could receive copies of her medical records.

Plaintiff only refused to sign *Mr. Wright's personal authorization forms*, which 1) were not even received by her prior to the 2:00 p.m. June 24, 2013 deadline for which completed authorization forms had to be submitted to Mr. Wright in order to prevent Plaintiff's case from being dismissed by Judge Borman on June 24, 2013 after the 2:00 p.m. deadline; and 2) contained clauses similar to records copying service forms that Plaintiff was in disagreement with, as already explained to the Judge in her first-party case.

As already explained in Appellant's Brief, at 11:24 a.m. on June 24, 2013, Plaintiff-Appellant personally delivered copies of cover letters to the healthcare providers, signed authorizations, and copies of the certificates of mailing to Mr. Wright's office, meeting her obligation of providing signed authorizations disclosing her medical records to Mr. Wright by 2:00 PM June 24, 2013, and meeting her obligation under MCR2.314(C)(1) to "(a) make the information available for inspection and copying as requested;" and/or "(d) furnish the requesting party with signed authorizations in the form approved by the state court administrator sufficient in number to enable the requesting party to obtain the information requested from persons, institutions, hospitals, and other custodians in actual possession of the information requested" (Exhibit C, signed cover letter verifying authorizations were received by Mr. Wright's law firm at 11:24 AM on 6-24-13; Exhibit O, Sample of one of Mr. Wright's HIPAA Privacy Authorization forms).

Plaintiff-Appellant in no way manipulated the physician-patient privilege so as to allow the Plaintiff to selectively disclose relevant evidence, as Defendant-Appellee has alleged. With regard to the production of medical records, Defendant Efficient Design's Motion to Compel was based on their request for production of "copies of any and all medical records relating to injuries received as a result of the subject accident", (Exhibit A, relevant page from Efficient Design's Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff dated 2-7-13, but mailed 4-30-13). Plaintiff-Appellant not only provided Mr. Wright with authorization forms that were sent to healthcare providers that treated her as a result of injuries received in the 1-15-10 auto accident, but also provided him with records from all of the healthcare providers she could recall that she ever obtained services from, prior to the accident. Note that Plaintiff-Appellant permitted disclosure of her records all the way back to birth, which is beyond what Mr. Wright asked for in

his Request for Production of Documents. She even included detailed lists for each healthcare provider of every visit date that was related to the 1-15-10 auto accident, to ensure that Defendants had a checklist upon which they could rely to verify that they received all records from the provider, as Plaintiff herself experienced prior difficulty obtaining certain visit notes in her own records simply by stating "any and all records" on the records request. It is clear from these actions that Plaintiff-Appellant permitted disclosure of all of the medical records discoverable using SCAO Form MC 315, and did not selectively choose which records to disclose.

It should be understood that Mr. Broaddus, attorney in this appeal for Kevin Culpert, replacing Mr. Culpert's trial court attorney, Mr. Hassouna, is the attorney filing this Motion to Affirm. Mr. Broaddus is <u>not</u> representing Efficient Design, yet throughout this motion, he mentions primarily content regarding Efficient Design. It is evidenced by the fact that Mr. Broaddus states in answer to the Counter-Statement of Question Involved, "Defendant-Appellee Efficient Design, Inc. will likely say: "yes," that he doesn't even have the affirmation in regard to this motion from the two attorneys representing Efficient Design. As pointed out in Appellant's Brief, Mr. Hassouna, Mr. Culpert's trial court attorney, did not have any valid objections to the dismissal of Plaintiff's third-party case against Kevin Culpert. It was Efficient Design's attorney, Mr. Wright, who filed the Motion to Dismiss. In the lower court proceedings, Plaintiff complied with all requests from Kevin Culpert's attorney, Mr. Hassouna, and he did not object to the method by which Plaintiff provided medical records to him. Although Mr. Hassouna did state that he was in concurrence with Mr. Wright's Order to Dismiss, he provided no additional reasons on his own behalf (Exhibit L, 7-22-13 Culpert's Concurrence with Efficient Design's Response to Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Order of Dismissal).

Further, in the 2011 case, Mr. Hassouna was ready to settle the case without Plaintiff's submission of any medical records (Exhibit Z, 6-1-13 Culpert's Motion to Extend Scheduling Dates stating he had no medical records for Plaintiff, 6-29-13 e-mail from Hassouna to Orlowski to determine if he will settle based on written discovery from Plaintiff (interrogatories); Exhibit M, 7-19-12 e-mail from Terry Cochran and attached settlement offer from Mr. Hassouna). Therefore, it doesn't appear to make sense for Mr. Broaddus to be arguing on behalf of Efficient Design since he does not represent them.

In conclusion, Defendant-Appellee's Counter-Statement of Question Involved is irrelevant and inapplicable because Plaintiff *did* sign and mail SCAO-mandated MC 315 authorizations to release any and all medical records to the Defendants, from health care providers prior to and after the accident, back to birth, without exceptions. Let it be clear that Plaintiff-Appellant's case was dismissed because she refused to sign Mr. Wright's *personal medical authorization forms*, which were non-compliant with the requirements on Form MC 315, *after* she had already mailed form MC 315 to over 20 health care providers and thereby had *already* satisfied her obligation to provide medical records under MCR 2.314(C)(1) (a) and/or (d).

## PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S ANSWER TO COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

On page 1, Defendant-Appellee erroneously states, "the suit on appeal here was actually a re-initiation of a 2011 combined first and third-party suit, Wayne County Circuit Court No. 11-014149-NF, which Plaintiff filed relative to the same accident. (Ex 1) the Circuit Court dismissed the suit without prejudice on August 22, 2012." Let it be clear that this was not a re-initiation of

that combined 2011 suit. This third-party case was re-filed separately from Plaintiff's first party case. The first- and third-party cases is are no longer combined, and are now each separately before the court of appeals on the same issue of being dismissed for the reason of the Court not permitting Plaintiff to use SCAO-mandated Form MC 315 to produce her medical records to the Defendants in either the first- or third-party case. It should be clear that Efficient Design, Inc. was not part of the original 2011 combined first- and third-party suit because Plaintiff's first attorney did not investigate whether Kevin Culpert was in the course and scope of his employment when the accident occurred, and did not add Efficient Design, Kevin Culpert's Employer, to the case at any time before it was dismissed. The Judge ordered the combined cases to be dismissed at a hearing held on July 20, 2012. The order to dismiss was later clarified and amended in regard to the refiling of the first party case only and what damages the Plaintiff could claim against MEEMIC.

On page 1, Defendant-Appellee states, "on or about February 7, 2013, Efficient requested (among other discovery) copies of Plaintiff's medical records. Culpert also requested various discovery from the Plaintiff, including requests for medical authorizations, on or about March 22, 2013. Plaintiff did not timely respond to these requests. Around the time that these requests were due, Plaintiff had a falling out with her attorney, Daryle Salisbury." Mr. Salisbury did not provide Plaintiff with said requests until February 21, 2013 (from Efficient Design) and March 8 (from Kevin Culpert), although they were dated February 7, 2013 and February 20, 2013, respectively (Exhibit R, 2-21-13 and 3-8-13 e-mails from Salisbury to Filas). At the time Plaintiff received Efficient Design's interrogatories and request for documents on 2-21-13, Plaintiff and Mr. Salisbury were involved in extensive discussions about matters concerning the no-fault auto case and she was not aware they were attached to an e-mail Mr. Salisbury sent.

Plaintiff dismissed her attorney in a certified letter dated March 8, 2013 (Exhibit S, 3-8-13 letter of dismissal from Filas to Salisbury). As will be further explained below, although the Register of Actions states that a Motion to Withdraw was granted, it is incorrect because Mr. Salisbury did not withdraw as her attorney---he was discharged by the Plaintiff. On March 19, 2013, Plaintiff requested extensions from both Culpert's and Efficient Design's attorneys to complete the interrogatories.) Both attorneys replied that they could not speak with Ms. Filas because the dismissal of Mr. Salisbury was not complete until an order had been entered by the court (Exhibit T, 3-19-13 request for extension to complete interrogatories, e-mailed from Filas to Hassouna and Mr. O'Malley, and their responses). Mr. Salisbury had attempted to persuade Ms. Filas to sign a substitution of attorney stipulation, substituting herself as the attorney of record. Ms. Filas wanted more time to secure the services of another attorney and refused to substitute herself and did not sign the stipulation. Plaintiff received a letter dated April 15, 2013 from Mr. Wright, attorney for Efficient Design, stating that her deposition had been adjourned until the Substitution of Attorney Order had been entered (Exhibit U, 4-15-13 letter from Wright to Filas regarding Substitution of Attorney Order). On April 29, 2013, Mr. Salisbury filed a Motion to Enter Substitution of Attorney Order---he never filed a motion to withdraw (Exhibit V, Salisbury's 4-29-13 Motion to Enter Substitution of Attorney Order).

Mr. Broaddus refers to a May 2, 2013 hearing for which Plaintiff did not order the transcript. Let it be clear that there were no hearings scheduled for May 2, 2013. The Register of Actions for May 1, 2013, indicates only a Status Conference to be held May 2, 2013, with Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance to be heard May 3, 2013, and Efficient Design's Motion to Compel Discovery from Plaintiff to be heard May 10, 2013 (Exhibit W, 5-1-13 and 5-23-13 Register of Actions). When Plaintiff entered the courtroom on Thursday, May 2, 2013, the court

was not conducting motion hearings, as would be held on Fridays in Borman's courtroom. Plaintiff doubts there is any transcript on file for May 2, 2013, because she does not believe any of the statements were made on the record that day. The judge decided not to grant any of the upcoming motions (Plaintiff's Motion for Continuance to be heard May 3, 2013, and Efficient Design's Motion to Compel Discovery from Plaintiff to be heard May 10, 2013) and issued a 30day stay on discovery or until Plaintiff retained new counsel. A 5-23-13 Register of Actions indicates that the aforementioned scheduled hearings were reset by Court to 5-2-13 on 5-3-13 (Exhibit W, 5-1-13 and 5-23-13 Register of Actions). The judge told Mr. Salisbury she would not enter a substitution order because the Plaintiff wasn't an attorney and that he was supposed to file an order of withdrawal with the court. In a discussion occurring in the court hallway, Mr. Salisbury stated that he would not put in an order to withdraw, and Plaintiff stated that she wasn't going to substitute herself, so the blank order was written to contain the language, "Darvle Salisbury is hereby discharged as counsel for Plaintiff" (Exhibit X, 5-3-13 Order Discharging Daryle Salisbury and granting 30-day stay on Discovery). The current Register of Actions incorrectly shows a Motion to Withdraw as Attorney having been granted on 5-2-13 (Exhibit D, Register of Actions dated 6-24-13 and 1-21-14). No motion to Withdraw was ever filed by Mr. Salisbury, and therefore could not have been granted.

On page 2, Defendant-Appellee states, "Representing herself, Plaintiff had a number of issues with Defendant's discovery requests." Let it be clear that the issues Plaintiff had with signing medical authorization forms for third-party record copying services arose shortly before the dismissal of the combined first and third-party case that was filed in 2011, before she even hired Mr. Salisbury to represent her. Before Plaintiff-Appellant hired Mr. Salisbury to refile the cases, it was agreed she could provide discovery materials herself, without the use of a records

copy service, which had been an unresolved issue with her previous attorney when the case was dismissed without prejudice. However, her new attorney breached this agreement by sending her third-party, Legal Copy Services authorization forms to sign from the third-party Defendant, Kevin Culpert, and refused to stand up for her right not to use the Legal Copy Services (LCS) forms to meet her obligation to provide discovery material to release her records to the Defendants. Let it be clear that this was the reason that Ms. Filas had to discharge this attorney and that he did not withdraw based on any of Ms. Filas's actions.

On page 2, Defendant-Appellee states, "as part of this motion to compel, Efficient sought 'signed medical authorizations' from the Plaintiff." As explained in Appellant's Brief, according to Efficient Design's Request for Production of Documents, Efficient Design sought "copies of any and all medical records relating to injuries received as a result of the subject accident" and Plaintiff complied with this request by sending copies of SCAO-mandated form MC 315 to her health care providers so that Mr. Wright could receive copies of said records. Defendant-Appellee continues, "as Efficient's counsel explained, this had been an ongoing problem dating back to the 2011 case" and refers to page 6 of the 6-21-13 transcript. On this page of the transcript, Mr. Wright, Efficient's counsel, states, "the problem is that I think we've been having going on with this case since when I was involved back to 2010 is that Ms. Filas is refusing to provide signed medical authorizations."

It is not true that Ms. Filas would not provide signed medical authorizations to obtain records for the Defendants in either the dismissed combined first- and third- party case referenced in Mr. Wright's 6-21-2013 statement above or after the first- and third- party cases were filed separately in 2012 and 2013, respectively. Plaintiff-Appellant only refused to sign medical authorizations provided by the defense attorneys that she felt had clauses in them that

she was not required to accept, and/or that gave the defendant's attorney permission to release her records to anyone they wanted to, or that they gave permission to a known non-party to the case, a records copy service, to copy and re-release her records to anyone who qualified to subscribe to their services, which Plaintiff contends is limited to attorneys and insurance companies.

Prior to the 6-21-13 hearing, Ms. Filas was never aware of Mr. Wright's involvement in the combined first- and third- party auto case filed by Mr. Cochran on November 15, 2011.

Plaintiff-Appellant informed Mr. Cochran when she hired him that she thought Kevin Culpert may have been in the scope of his employment when he rear-ended her vehicle, because prior to the accident he had almost run her off the road. After he drifted into her lane and she avoided hitting him, she passed him. As she was passing him, she observed he was using a cell phone or other lighted device near the console in his vehicle. Mr. Cochran told Ms. Filas that he would investigate any and all sources of re-numeration that could be provided to Plaintiff- Appellant related to her accident.

Mr. Cochran told Ms. Filas not to sell her vehicle until his investigation was complete.

On or around February 2012, Mr. Cochran informed Plaintiff-Appellant, that the maximum award she could get on the third party tort against Kevin Culpert was \$20,000 from the Progressive Policy held by Mr. Culpert. Mr. Cochran never mentioned any other sources to Plaintiff-Appellant, from which she could file a claim for damages. In March of 2012, he told her she could sell her truck. The person Plaintiff-Appellant sold her truck to asked he if she looked into any other policies that might offer benefits such as a homeowner's policy or an employer's liability policy. Mr. Cochran continued to state all she could collect was \$20,000 in the third party case. He stated this again on May 29, 2012 when she met with him at his office.

When asked if he was still going to hire a biomechanical engineer, as he stated he might do when she hired him, he said no, because she only had a \$20,000 third-party claim. He said that if her claim would have been a million dollars, then it would have justified the cost of hiring the engineer.

In July of 2012, Mr. Cochran presented Ms. Filas with a settlement agreement from Mr. Hasounna, Mr. Culpert's attorney, that required her to agree to settle what she believed to be all third party claims, for \$20,000 (Exhibit M, 7-19-12 e-mail from Terry Cochran and attached settlement offer from Mr. Hassouna). Ms. Filas did not want to sign any settlement until it had been determined for certain that Mr. Culpert was not in the course and scope of this employment when the accident occurred. Mr. Cochran claimed he was not, but offered no proof. He told her that Mr. Hassouna would vigorously defend any further claims against Kevin Culpert in a letter dated 7-16-12. The submission of this document for evidence does imply that Plaintiff-Appellant accepts the views and accountings of Mr. Cochran's assessment of her medical condition to be factual or accurate. (Exhibit Y, 7-16-12 letter from Cochran to Ms. Filas regarding settlement from Hassouna).

Plaintiff was led to believe by Mr. Cochran that there were not any other responsible parties other the Kevin Culpert that could be added to the third party case. Mr. Cochran said Mr. Hassouna would provide a sworn statement from Mr. Culpert that he was not in the scope of his employment. This was never provided by Mr. Hassouna. Ms. Filas wanted Mr. Cochran to get Mr. Culpert's phone records first and then go from there. He never did any further discovery prior to the final discovery date set by Judge Borman of June 17, 2012 (Exhibit N, Scheduling order for initial consolidated first- and third-party cases showing Discovery Cutoff of 6-17-12).

Plaintiff finds it disturbing that Mr. Wright admits to being involved in her prior combined first- and third-party case filed 11-15-11 by Terry Cochran. Why would Mr. Wright be allowed involvement with that case if he was never listed as a Defendant on that case? Kevin Culpert's phone records were never obtained by Mr. Cochran. Mr. Cochran never deposed Kevin Culpert or sent him interrogatories to determine whether or not Efficient Design was liable for any damages. As Plaintiff has mentioned, she does not understand why Mr. Hassouna could settle Ms. Filas's case with his adjuster in 2012, before or after Judge Borman dismissed the combined first and third party case, without any medical information, based solely on written statements from Plaintiff (unsigned interrogatories from Tamara Filas provided by Mr. Cochran without her final authorization or signature) as he claimed was all he had in in a 6-29-12 e-mail to MEEMIC's attorney, Mr. Orlowski, and, then when the third party tort case was filed separately on January 14, 2013, with Efficient Design added, he all of sudden needed new interrogatories and more medical information than he had before offering to settle in 2012 (Exhibit Z, 6-1-13 Culpert's Motion to Extend Scheduling Dates stating he had no medical records for Plaintiff, 6-29-13 e-mail from Hassouna to Orlowski to determine if he will settle based on written discovery from Plaintiff (interrogatories); Exhibit M, 7-19-12 e-mail from Terry Cochran and attached settlement offer from Mr. Hassouna).

It is reasonable for Plaintiff –Appellant to argue that Mr. Hassouna's adjuster from Progressive Insurance may not have authorized funds from Progressive Insurance to settle the case against Kevin Culpert without additional medical verification of Plaintiff's injuries, and that another entity was going to provide the funds to settle the claim against Kevin Culpert other the Progressive Insurance, or that Mr. Hassouna already had medical records from another source, such as MEEMIC Insurance who was given medical records from the U of M Healthcare System

and/or another major health care provider, or from Mr. Cochran from the personal medical records Ms. Filas gave Mr. Cochran when she hired him in the presence of her father November 3, 2011, or records obtained from blank records copy service forms Mr. Cochran directed Plaintiff to sign at the time she hired him.

Plaintiff believes that even if Mr. Cochran did add Efficient Design to the case a few days before the discovery was scheduled to end, he may not have been able to obtain the evidence he needed to prove Kevin Culpert was in the scope of his employment in time to pursue a claim against Efficient Design.

On page 2 of the 6-21-13 hearing transcript, Defendant-Appellee states, "Plaintiff did not express any objection to the language of the authorizations at that time," the time referred to being at the June 21, 2013 hearing. Let it be clear that at this time, Plaintiff had not even seen the authorizations that Mr. Wright planned to provide to her. Judge Borman ordered Mr. Wright to e-mail his authorization forms to Ms. Filas on 6-21-2013. Ms. Filas did not receive the forms by 5 o'clock at the standard close of business on 6-21-2013. The FedExed authorizations were not delivered to Ms. Filas's porch until 3:00 PM on June 24, 2013 (Exhibit E, 6-24-13 FedEx time/date stamped envelope, stamped 3:00 PM). She did not discover them until after 3:30 p.m. 6-21-13. It would not have been possible for Plaintiff to express objections to authorizations she had never seen. Although Efficient Design's counsel claims he was unable to prepare the authorizations in advance because they didn't know Plaintiff's providers until she had submitted completed interrogatories, Plaintiff-Appellant contends he could have provided blank copies for the Plaintiff to fill in her providers. On pages 2-3, Defendant-Appellee refers to page 9 of the transcript for the June 21, 2013 hearing, and states "counsel for Culpert, [Mr. Hassouna,] requested 'the same relief' that the Efficient had been given because Culpert had also been

read the transcript from page 9 to the end, one would see that twice, Plaintiff attempted to inform the judge that she already provided answers to interrogatories and signed, completed, and mailed copies of SCAO-mandated form MC 315 to Mr. Hassouna that morning before the hearing, but she was cut off by the judge and the topic was never returned to (Exhibit AA, pages 9-10 of 6-21-13 transcript). As previously stated, although Mr. Hassouna filed a concurrence with Mr. Wright's motion to dismiss, he stated no arguments or reasons for his concurrence, such as being unsatisfied by the interrogatory answers or the copies of Form MC 315 that had been sent to Ms. Filas is healthcare providers (Exhibit L, 7-22-13 Culpert's Concurrence with Efficient Design's Response to Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Order of Dismissal).

On page 3, Defendant-Appellee states that, "Plaintiff did not sign the authorizations by 2:00 PM the following Monday [6-24-13]" and refers to page 3 of the 6-24-13 transcript, further stating that "Efficient's counsel explained that Plaintiff 'did stop by my office and she provided some authorizations' but 'they were altered.'" Plaintiff-Appellant later realized that what Defendant meant by "altered" was that she provided Mr. Wright with copies of completed SCAO-mandated form MC 315 instead of his own personal forms. Plaintiff-Appellant contends that this is not an alteration because in order to make an alteration, she would have had to have Mr. Wright's forms in her possession at the time she delivered the copies of form MC 315 to his office at 11:24 AM on 6-21-13, which she did not. Defendant-Appellee continues, "Plaintiff had also failed to return some of the requested authorizations at all." Again, Plaintiff did not return any of Mr. Wright's personal authorization forms as she did not have them in her possession yet on the morning of June 21, 2013. She submitted only copies of signed and completed SCAO-mandated Form 315 that had been mailed to her healthcare providers listed in the interrogatories

on June 21, 2013, and certificates of mailing to verify this, were provided to Mr. Wright along with the copies of the forms on the morning of 6-24-13.

Because she did not have any of Mr. Wright's authorization forms at the time she dropped off copies of form MC 315 to his office on 6-24-13, Plaintiff-Appellant could not have selectively chosen specific forms to return to Mr. Wright. In addition to authorization forms for her medical providers, the FedEx packet mailed by Mr. Wrights law firm on June 21, 2013 and delivered to Plaintiff-Appellant's address at 3:00 pm June 24, 2013, after the deadline of Judge Borman's order for Plaintiff-Appellant to produce the medical authorization forms to Mr. Wright at 2:00 pm on June 24, 2013, included additional requests for Plaintiff-Appellant to produce documents and additional authorization forms for Plaintiff-Appellant to fill out to release the documents, which included her academic records, employment records, tax returns, Blue Cross Blue Shield and MEEMIC insurance records, psychotherapy notes, and records from Don Massey Cadillac, never previously requested. The packet from Mr. Wright delivered by FedEx June 24, 2013 at 3:00 pm was delivered after Plaintiff had personally delivered the SCAO medical authorization forms to Mr. Wright's office on June 24, 2013 at 11:24 am, and after the June 24, 2013, 2:00 pm deadline that Judge Borman ordered Plaintiff-Appellant to produce authorization forms provided by Mr. Wright, to Mr. Wright. None of the requests for the production of documents for which the additional authorization were sent, were previously requested by Efficient Design in the original Interrogatories or Requests for Production of Documents mailed to Plaintiff-Appellant April 30, 2013, that Plaintiff-Appellant complied with delivering to Mr. Wright on June 21, 2013 at the Court. Plaintiff-Appellant was not previously aware Efficient Design desired for her to produce the additional documents. Plaintiff-Appellant did not "alter" by selectively choosing specific records to be received by Efficient Design. The

request for these additional records was never made until after she mailed the SCAO medical authorizations to release her medical records to Mr. Wright on June 21, 2013. Plaintiff-Appellant contends a new Motion to Compel would need to be filed in order to request records beyond those originally requested and for which the 6-21-13 Motion to Compel was in regard.

Defendant-Appellee states on page 3 that the Plaintiff did not appear for the 6-24-13 hearing and brings up a claim that Ms. Filas was impersonating her mother, after Plaintiff already rebutted this claim and provided a sworn affidavit from her mother in her 8-6-13 Reply To Plaintiff's Objection To Defendant Efficient Design Inc.'s Proposed Order Of Dismissal Without Prejudice. Plaintiff-Appellant did not appear at the court on 6-24-13 because she was never contacted by Mr. Wright that the authorizations he received that morning were unacceptable to him. Plaintiff is disturbed that the court clerk, Precious Smith, would accuse her of impersonating her mother. Plaintiff is uncertain why Ms. Smith would have called her mother's phone number, 734-981-0666, in the first place, as it does not appear on any of the court filings or as the contact number in the e-filing records. Plaintiff only has one cell phone with the number 734-751-0103, that is equipped with voice mail service. Ms. Smith has called and left messages at Plaintiff's correct number in the past, so it is unusual that she would try to call Plaintiff's mother's number this time. Plaintiff has provided a sworn affidavit from her mother, with caller ID and phone records to substantiate that the court clerk spoke to Plaintiff's mother, not Plaintiff herself, and called Plaintiff's mother's number instead of the number on file for the Plaintiff (Exhibit BB, 6-24-13 phone and caller ID records, 8-5-13 affidavit of Kathleen Filas).

At the June 21, 2013 hearing, Plaintiff's understanding was that she had to deliver signed authorizations to Mr. Wright by 2:00 PM, not that she had to make a court appearance with the authorizations at 2:00 PM. On page 8 of the transcript, the Court states, "If he does not get those

authorizations by Monday or you can come back Monday at 2 o'clock, and you can come back with the authorizations." On page 17 of the 6-21-13 transcript, the Court states, "I'll see you Monday, hopefully not," indicating that if Plaintiff submitted the authorizations to Mr. Wright, there would be no reason for anyone to come to court at 2:00 p.m. on June 20, 2013. Plaintiff looked at the Register of Actions on the morning of June 24, 2013 and printed a Register of Actions on June 24, 2013 after the close of court at 4:30 PM and no hearing was shown for June 24, 2013 (Exhibit D, Register of Actions dated 6-24-13 and 1-21-14). However, currently the Register of Actions lists a "special conference" held on June 24, 2013 at 2:00 PM.

Plaintiff was not aware a "special conference" was going to be held on June 24, 2013 at 2:00 PM. Defendant's attorney, Mr. Wright never informed Plaintiff that the fully executed authorizations that Plaintiff had signed and mailed June 21, 2013 to her providers that she hand delivered copies to his office at 11:24 AM June 24, 2013 were deemed by Mr. Wright to be "altered", necessitating a court appearance at 2:00 PM June 24, 2013. Defendant-Appellee states on page 3, "At that point [the 8-9-13 hearing], Plaintiff indicated, for the first time in this lawsuit, that 'I have a problem with some of the clauses.'" Again, let it be clear that Plaintiff did not receive any authorization forms from Mr. Wright until after she had already mailed copies of SCAO-mandated Form MC 315 to her healthcare providers on June 21, 2013. Therefore, in her 7-5-13 and 8-6-13 Objections to the 7-Day Order of Dismissal, Plaintiff argued only that she had met her obligation to provide her medical records to Mr. Wright and that her case should not have been dismissed. Plaintiff argued that Mr. Wright requested records beyond those for which his Motion to Compel was based. Plaintiff never expected the judge to order her at the 8-9-13 hearing to either re-request her medical records from the same 20-some healthcare providers, using Mr. Wright's personal forms, or let her case be dismissed. Therefore, Plaintiff did not

argue her concerns with Mr. Wright's forms prior to the 8-9-13 hearing. Plaintiff had to allow her case to be dismissed, knowing that she had already completed her legal obligation to submit her medical records when she sent out copies of form MC 315 to her providers, and was under no obligation to repeat the entire process using Mr. Wright's forms. Let it be clear that as soon as Plaintiff brought up to Judge Borman that she had a problem with the clauses, she was immediately cut off from speaking about the issues because the Judge stated she had already ruled on that (Exhibit P, 8-19-13 transcript, pg. 3-4, showing Ms. Filas was not permitted to present her arguments regarding Mr. Wright's forms). Therefore, Plaintiff-Appellant should not be faulted for not bringing up her issues with the forms until 8-9-13, and for not having preserved them in writing in the third-party case. As stated previously, this is the reason Plaintiff-Appellant refers to filings from the first-party case---because the judge did not allow her to provide oral arguments in regards to Plaintiff's issues with the medical authorization forms she was being asked to sign in the third-party case. If Plaintiff had filed a motion for reconsideration in the third-party case, although she could have discussed her objections to the medical authorization forms in writing, she likely would have been accused by the judge of filing a frivolous motion for the fact that the judge told her that she already ruled on this issue in the first-party case, just moments before dismissing her third-party case, and would likely consider it a waste of the court's time since Plaintiff already knew the judge's opinion on the issue.

It is extremely important to note that prior to the hearing on Efficient Design's Motion to Compel on June 21, 2013, and prior to the dismissal of claims against Efficient Design on June 24, 2013 by Judge Borman in the third party tort case filed on January 14, 2013, Plaintiff-Appellant had already filed a Claim of Appeal with the Appellate Court on June 20, 2013, appealing the decision of Judge Borman to dismiss Plaintiff's first-party no-fault auto case

against MEEMIC Insurance because Plaintiff-Appellant refused to sign forms provided from a records copy service "as-is" that were provided by MEEMIC insurance for her to sign to release her medical information to that service to meet her obligation to provide medical records to MEEMICS's attorney (Exhibit CC, 4-26-13 transcript from dismissal of MEEMIC case, pg. 4-5).

## PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S ANSWER TO STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Defendant-Appellee claims the Court of Appeals "reviews for an abuse of discretion" which "occurs only when the trial court's decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes." Plaintiff-Appellant contends that the trial court's decision to dismiss her case because it refused to accept the copies of SCAO-mandated Form MC 315 she had already sent to her healthcare providers to disclose copies of her medical records to both Defendants, Kevin Culpert and Efficient Design, is an abuse of discretion, and is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. There are only 4 principled outcomes, a-d, when a party is served with a request for production of documents, as provided under MCR 2.314(C)(1).

MCR 2.314(C)(1), Response by Party to Request for Medical Information, states:

- (1) A party who is served with a request for production of medical information under MCR 2.310 must either:
- (a) make the information available for inspection and copying as requested;
- (b) assert that the information is privileged;
- (c) object to the request as permitted by MCR 2.310(C)(2); or
- (d) furnish the requesting party with signed authorizations in the form approved by the state court administrator sufficient in number to enable the

requesting party to obtain the information requested from persons, institutions, hospitals, and other custodians in actual possession of the information requested.

Since Plaintiff-Appellant's submission of SCAO-Mandated form MC 315, the form approved by the state court administrator, to her health care providers would satisfy MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d), and Plaintiff can also be considered to have satisfied MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) because she did make the information available to the Defendants by sending form MC 315 to her healthcare providers, the outcome of having her case dismissed cannot be considered to be a "reasonable and principled outcome."

## PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S ANSWER TO ARGUMENT

On pages 5 and 6, Defendant-Appellee refers to assertions of privilege, which is completely irrelevant to this case as Plaintiff did not assert any privilege, and provided copies of signed, completed, medical authorization forms to her health care providers so that both Defendants, Kevin Culpert and Efficient Design, could receive copies of Plaintiff's medical records. Although Plaintiff's argument #1 in her Appellant's Brief Plaintiff-Appellant stated that she believed it was reasonable for her not to disclose her records to Efficient Design until it was verified they were a liable party in the case, this was not the same as an assertion of privilege under 2.314(B). Plaintiff still contends she should not have had to release personal or medical information to Efficient Design until they had admitted liability, to avoid having her case dismissed, so she followed the Judge's order to provide medical record authorization release

forms to Mr. Wright, as previously explained. (Exhibit B, Relevant page of Mr. Wright's 2-5-13 Answer to Complaint against Efficient Design stating Culpert was not an agent of Efficient Design and was not in the course and scope of his employment when the alleged accident occurred).

On page 7, Defendant-Appellee states, "Plaintiff's principal argument on appeal - that the trial court ordered her to sign authorizations that were inconsistent with the 'SCAOmandated' forms - was not raised below, and therefore is not preserved for appellate review." Plaintiff's *principal* argument on appeal was not "that the trial court ordered her to sign authorizations that were inconsistent with the 'SCAO-mandated' forms." Although Plaintiff-Appellant did argue that she cannot be required to sign forms that differed from the State Court Administrative Office, Plaintiff-Appellant's principal argument on appeal was that she had met her legal obligation to provide her medical records to the Defendants under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) and/or MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d) when on June 21, 2013, she provided Defendant, Kevin Culpert's attorney, Mr. Hassouna, with copies of completed, signed SCAO-mandated Form MC 315 medical authorization forms, that had already been mailed to Plaintiff's healthcare providers on June 19, 2013; and provided Mr. Wright, attorney for Efficient Design, Inc., with the same documents (answers to interrogatories and completed, fully executed SCAO MC-315 medical release forms), but addressed so that Mr. Wright would receive the Plaintiff's medical records. from the authorizations mailed on June 21, 2013 at his business address. Plaintiff-Appellant delivered certificates of mailing and copies of the filled out SCAO forms that were already mailed, to Mr. Wright's office at 11:24 a.m. on June 24, 2013. Let it be clear that Plaintiff-Appellant began to raise her issues regarding Mr. Wright's authorization forms, which were not received by her until after she already mailed copies of MC 315 to her healthcare providers, at

the August 9, 2013 hearing. The judge did not permit Plaintiff to state her arguments on the record because she had already ruled on the issue of medical authorization forms in Plaintiff's first-party auto case. Plaintiff does not consider herself to have raised any new arguments in her appeal that were not already raised before the same judge, and previously ruled upon in the trial court.

Whether or not the issue of the SCAO forms was preserved or not still does not change the fact that the Plaintiff met her legal obligation under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) to provide her medical records to the Defendants by "[making] the information available for copying and inspection as requested," as explained in Argument #2 of Appellant's Brief. Under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a), it doesn't matter what forms were used, as long as the records were provided.

On page 8, Defendant-Appellee states, "Dismissing the case, in light of Plaintiff's conduct, also fell squarely within the Circuit Courts' broad inherent authority." Plaintiff contends that her request to the Court to be permitted to follow the procedures outlined in the Michigan Court Rules, i.e. MCR 2.314(C)(1), in no way constitutes improper conduct on the Plaintiff's part.

There is no defined method of providing medical records under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a), which merely states the obligation to "make the information available for copying and inspection as requested" which Plaintiff did. MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d) provides for the use of form MC 315, which states the option of "furnish[ing] the requesting party with signed authorizations in the form approved by the State Court Administrator sufficient in number to enable the requesting party to obtain the information requested from persons, institutions, hospitals, and other custodians in actual possession of the information requested." Under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d), it is mandated that the authorization form to be used is MC 315. The PDF of the

list of court-mandated forms, located at

http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/Forms/Documents/Mandatory%20Use%20List/mandatory\_use\_lists.pdf, indicates that MC forms are for circuit court use. MC 315 would therefore be used in the circuit court. (See Exhibit J, List of SCAO-mandated forms; and Exhibit K, SCAO-mandated form MC 315).

The position of the Michigan Supreme Court in regard to the use of Form MC 315 was re-confirmed on 6-23-11, in a memorandum from Chad C. Schmucker, State Court Administrator, sent to Chief Judges, Court Administrators/Clerks, Probate Registers, County Clerks, and SCAO Regional Administrators. He states, "We have received some reports of courts refusing to accept SCAO-approved court forms. It has been difficult to determine specifically where this is occurring and whether it is a court policy, a practice of an individual judge, or simple misunderstanding by a court clerk. This memo is intended to clarify what is already the practice of almost all of the courts across the state." Mr. Schmucker quotes the procedural rules regarding forms contained in MCR 1.109, stating, "Unless specifically required by statute or court rule, the court may not mandate the use of a specific form, whether SCAOapproved or locally developed." Mr. Schmucker also clarifies that, "Courts cannot impose additional procedures beyond those contained in the court rules. Therefore, all courts must accept court forms approved by the Supreme Court or the state court administrator" (Exhibit DD, 6-23-11 Memorandum from Chad C. Schmucker, State Court Administrator). Therefore, Plaintiff's submission of MC 315 should have been accepted by the lower court. Further, Plaintiff-Appellant previously contended that the only form Judge Borman could have ordered her to sign would have been SCAO-mandated Form MC 315. Plaintiff-Appellant now changes her position and contends that the Court could not have mandated her to use any specific form,

## PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S ANSWER TO CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendant-Appellee states on page 9 that "There is no dispute that Defendants were entitled to the authorizations requested." This statement is nonsensical because there is obviously a dispute or the case would not be in the Court of Appeals for the Plaintiff contending that she satisfied her obligation to produce her medical records and that she did not have to provide Mr. Wright with his own personal authorization forms.

Plaintiff-Appellant contends she had no legal obligation to produce discovery records to Mr. Wright using non-specific "as-is" medical authorization forms selected and provided by Mr. Wright, that neither she or the Judge were given a copy of on June 21, 2013 when Judge Borman ordered her to sign Mr. Wright's forms "as is." Furthermore, Plaintiff-Appellant contends that her sole obligation was to provide her medical records. MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) provides the Plaintiff-Appellant the choice to "make the information available for copying and inspection as requested," without the necessity of providing any specific type of authorization forms to the Defendant at all.

If Plaintiff-Appellant would not have provided any forms to Mr. Wright on June 24, 2013, her case would surely have been dismissed by Judge Borman. Plaintiff- Appellant has shown her good faith to provide her medical records to Mr. Wright as evidenced by her action to provide medical records to Mr. Wright, and by not rescinding any of the authorizations, some of which had already been fulfilled by June 24, 2013, even though Mr. Wright has still not met Judge Borman's order to depose Mr. Culpert to determine if he was in the scope of his

employment when the accident occurred on January 15, 2010 (Exhibit H, 8-2-13 e-mail from Ms. Filas to Mr. Hassouna, Mr. Wright and Mr. O'Malley; and Mr. Hassouna's response).

Plaintiff-Appellant fully understands that it is legal for parties to agree sign authorization forms that have objectionable clauses, as long as the parties are in agreement with the objectionable, questionable or ambiguous clauses. However, Plaintiff-Appellant was not in agreement with signing forms "as-is" provided by the Defendant-Appellee that she contends could cause her harm.

Plaintiff-Appellant knows of no provision in the Michigan No Fault Insurance Act, or any other law, that would trump the use of mandated SCAO form MC 315 for the production of discovery documents containing Plaintiff-Appellant's private medical records or, would allow the lower court to order and mandate the Plaintiff-Appellant to produce the medical her records using an authorization form, "as-is," sight unseen, to be provided to Plaintiff-Appellant by the Defendant-Appellee without allowing Plaintiff-Appellant to object to and/or refuse to sign the "as-is" documents. As the 6-23-11 Supreme Court memo states, quoted from MCR 1.109, "Unless specifically required by statute or court rule, the court may not mandate the use of a specific form, whether SCAO-approved or locally developed" (Exhibit DD, 6-23-11 Memorandum from Chad C. Schmucker, State Court Administrator). Therefore, the Court could not order Plaintiff to use any specific form.

Plaintiff also contends she is not required to provide medical records not listed on the SCAO form that were required on Mr. Wright's forms she received on 6-24-13, without a "just cause" hearing, before she could be required to provide them. Plaintiff-Appellant further contends she was not obligated to produce records beyond the medical records requested in Mr. Wright's 4-30-13 Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, which was the basis for his

Motion to Compel, for which the hearing was held on 6-21-13, and that a new Motion to Compel must be filed by Mr. Wright to obtain an order for her to produce additional records that were not requested in the 4-30-13 Request for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, and this was also not a valid reason to dismiss her case.

On page 9, Defendant-Appellee states, "Since Plaintiff has not cited any precedent contrary to the trial court's decision, it is impossible for her to say that the trial court erred."

No precedent would be required for a case in which clear and unambiguous court rule, MCR 2.314(C)(1), has been violated by the Circuit Court's ruling to dismiss Plaintiff-Appellant's case based on the court's refusal to allow Plaintiff-Appellant to provide her medical records to the Defendant-Appellees in the method(s) provided for under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) and/or MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d).

It is also highly probable that there are no other similar cases to Plaintiff's current firstand third- party cases, in which a party is attempting to uphold court rule MCR 2.314(C)(1). It
can reasonably be argued that most people involved in an auto accident hire an attorney to handle
their claims. It is not uncommon for a person to trust what their lawyer tells them. Plaintiff
herself was caught in this trap when she signed illegal blank forms for her first attorney,
believing that his practices were legal at the time until she was told otherwise by one of her
healthcare providers. It can reasonably be argued therefore that most people would sign the
forms they were provided by their attorneys without question, and without investigating the court
rules regarding the production of medical records. Therefore, it is highly probable that no other
case such as Ms. Filas's first- and third- party cases currently in the Court of Appeals, regarding
the right of the Plaintiff to use the SCAO form MC 315 to provide medical information to
Defendants, has ever been challenged, dismissed and appealed to the Court of Appeals.

It is also unusual that Plaintiff would have to go to such lengths to have a clear and unambiguous Court Rule, MCR 2.314(C)(1), followed by the Circuit Court. On page 9, Defendant-Appellee states, "it is not enough for an appellant in his brief simply to announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position." In her Brief, Plaintiff-Appellant clearly stated Court Rule MCR 2.314(C)(1) in its entirety, and provided clear arguments and rationale for having met the requirements to provide her medical records to the Defendants. There is nothing the Court of Appeals would be required to discover, unravel or elaborate for the Plaintiff-Appellant. Their only responsibility is to require that the lower court uphold the provisions of MCR 2.314(C)(1) and consider Plaintiff-Appellant's obligation to provide her medical records to have been met under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) and/or MCR 2.314(C)(1)(d).

Further, it would not even be logical that all cases before the Court of Appeals would be required to state a precedent, because no new issues could ever be brought up and settled and there would be no point in even having a Court of Appeals.

As an intermediate appellate court, the principal function of this Court of Appeals is to correct errors made by lower courts. *Halbert v Michigan*, 545 US 605, 617 n 3: 125 S Ct 2582 (2005). Clearly, an error has been made by the lower court's refusal of Plaintiff-Appellant's submission of SCAO-mandated Form MC 315, that was sent to her health care providers so that her medical records could be received by both Defendants, Kevin Culpert and Efficient Design. As previously stated, the proper relief would be to require that the lower court uphold the provisions of MCR 2.314(C)(1) and consider Plaintiff-Appellant's obligation to provide her medical records to the Defendants to have been met under MCR 2.314(C)(1)(a) and/or MCR

2.314(C)(1)(d). For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff-Appellant requests that the Court deny Defendant-Appellee's Motion to Affirm.

Further, Plaintiff believes it was an error on the part of the Circuit Court to dismiss her entire case against both Kevin Culpert and Efficient Design. They involve different insurance companies and different policies. In the lower court proceedings, Plaintiff complied with all requests from Kevin Culpert's attorney, Mr. Hassouna, and he did not object to the method by which Plaintiff provided medical records to him. Although Mr. Hassouna did state that he was in concurrence with Mr. Wright's Order to Dismiss, he provided no additional reasons on his own behalf to have Kevin Culpert's case dismissed. Also, as explained previously, it is unusual that Mr. Broaddus, appellate attorney replacing circuit court attorney, Mr. Hassouna, is now arguing his Motion to Affirm on behalf of Defendant Efficient Design, whom he does not even represent, and still does not bring up any issues regarding the forms that Plaintiff provided to Mr. Hassouna. Plaintiff still contends that the dismissal of her case against Kevin Culpert should be reversed by this Court, regardless of the decision pertaining to the dismissal of Plaintiff's case against Efficient Design.

	Signature
1-21-14	The state of the s
Date	Tamara Filas
	6477 Edgewood
	Canton, MI 48187
	(734) 751-0103
	filastamd7@gmail.com

## Exhibit FF

1	attorney gave them out without my permission.
2	THE COURT: All right, okay. I think that
3	takes care of everything. I'll see you Monday,
4	hopefully not. How come you didn't just bring
5	authorizations with you today knowing that
6	MR. WRIGHT: Your Honor, I didn't know who
7	her treaters were until I got the interrogatories
8	this morning.
9	THE COURT: Okay.
10	MR. WRIGHT: So that's why I didn't.
11	THE COURT: All right. So you're going to
12	have and how many treaters are there?
13	MR. WRIGHT: About 27.
14	THE COURT: Okay, you're going to sign all
15	those authorizations, otherwise no case.
16	MS. FILAS: Can I fill out something that
17	says that the Protection Order's been vacated or that
18	it doesn't exist?
19	THE COURT: Fill out a blank order. It
20	doesn't exists. It wasn't even in this case.
21	MS. FILAS: I could never get a clear
22	answer from the other attorneys though whether it was
23	still in effect or not. I don't know, it would make
24	me feel better if I had it writing that it didn't
25	exist anymore just so there wasn't any further